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INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating'
which held that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") 2 applies in state
courts and preempts conflicting state law,3 is of central importance in
modern Anerican arbitration law. 4 In Southland, the Court effectively
"federalized" United States arbitration law, "restrict[ing] state legislative rights" so as "to guarantee the 'unobstructed enforcement' of arbitration agreements." 5 Following Southland, courts have held literally
dozens of state laws to be preempted by the FAA. 6 The widespread
use of arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts,
1 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
2 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000). When enacted, section 14 of the Act provided that
"this Act may be referred to as 'The United States Arbitration Act.'" Act of Feb. 12,
1925, ch. 213, § 14, 43 Stat. 883, 886 (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16). In 1947,
Congress codified the United States Arbitration Act ("USAA") as Title 9 of the United
States Code and deleted the section 14 popular-name provision. Act ofJuly 30, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 80-282, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (current version at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16).
Since then, "[w]hile Congress did not rename the act, it has now become customary
to refer to it as the FAA." 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 5.3.1,
at 5:6 n.3 (Supp. 1999). To avoid confusion and despite the anachronism, I will refer
to the Act as the FAA, even when in the original sources it is called the USAA.
3 Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16.
4 See, e.g.,
I MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.6.1, at 10:25 (revision by Ian R.
Macneil) (describing Southland as an "exceptionally important" case); Stephen J.
Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a ContractualistReply to
Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORCE L. REV. 195, 197 n.8 (1998) (describing application of the FAA in state court as an "enormously important" question).
5

THOMAS

E.

CARBONNEAU,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF

ARBITRATION 162 (2d ed. 2000).
6 See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.8.3, at 10:96-:101.
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called the "consumerization" of arbitration by Tom Stipanowich, 7 is
due at least in part to Southland, under which state laws restricting the

arbitration of such disputes are preempted. 8
Yet the majority opinion in Southland, written by Chief Justice

Burger, is widely held to be an illegitimate exercise in judicial lawmaking, flatly inconsistent with congressional intent in enacting the FAA.
Commentators have lined up behindJustice O'Connor, whose dissent
derided the Chief Justice's majority opinion as an "exercise in judicial
revisionism" that ignored the "unambiguous" legislative history of the

FAA as a procedural statute applicable only in federal court. 9 Paul
Carrington and Paul Haagen, for example, declare that "the opinion
of the Court was an extraordinarily disingenuous manipulation of the
history of the 1925 Act," 10 and that "the Court relied almost wholly on
its bogus legislative history" in holding the FAA applicable in state
court. 1 Edward Brunet states that "[t]he Southland decision is remarkable for its preemption holding that blatantly ignores legislative
intent."1 2 According to Robert Gorman, "Southland has been persuasively criticized as a perversion of the legislative history of the Act,
which rather clearly was intended to apply only to litigation in the
federal courts."'13 Even those who otherwise ardently defend the Supreme Court's arbitration decisions concede that, "Unfortunately,
Southland did not acknowledge the original understanding of the FAA
14
as procedural law governing only in federal court."
7 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages and the Consumerization of Arbitration, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Growing Debate over
'Consumerized' Arbitration: Adding Cole to the Fire,Disp. RESOL. MAG., Summer 1997, at
20; see also Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute
[Mandatory] Arbitration Outlived Its Welcome?, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (1998) (discussing consumerization of arbitration).
8 See Sarah R. Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO Sr.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 759, 786-88 & nn.92-100 (2001) (cataloguing current and pending
state laws that restrict consumer and employment arbitration).
9 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25, 36 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).

10

Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT.

REV. 331, 380.

Id. at 381.
Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1459, 1469 n.33 (1996).
13 Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law
11
12

Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 677 n.133.

14 STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.7, at 30 (2001). Elsewhere, Professor Ware notes, "I have argued that, with one possible exception, the
Court has faithfully applied the Federal Arbitration Act." Ware, supra note 4, at 197.
"The one possible exception," according to Ware,
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The leading critic of Southlands historical analysis is Ian R. Macneil, who exhaustively analyzes the legislative history of the FAA in his
book, American A'rbitration Law: Reformation, Nationalization,Internationalization.1 5 Professor Macneil canvasses the hearings, reports, and
floor debates on the FAA, contemporaneous writings by supporters of
the Act and others, and state and federal cases in the years immediately following enactment of the Act. 1 6 He concludes that the FAA's
legislative history "more than justifies" Justice O'Connor's statement
in Southland that "' [o] ne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's.'"1 7 According to Macneil, "[t]here is no serious ambiguity here":' 8 "the proposed [FAA] was intended to apply only in
federal courts. It was never intended to create substantive federal regulatory law superseding state law under the Supremacy Clause of the
federal Constitution."' 9 Macneil has described Chief Justice Burger's
20
opinion as reflecting a "painfully misleading history of the FAA":
not only does he find ambiguities where no real ones exist, but
[he] . . .dismisses as mere ambiguities the vast and unambiguous

mass of the legislative history, not the few scraps he himself produces. And "dismisses" is truly the right word because in spite of the
dissent's presentation of a large part of that unambiguous mass, the
21
Chief Justice never so much as deigns to cast it a further glance.
In the 1999 Supplement to Federal ArbitrationLaw, the arbitration treatise of which Macneil is a co-author, the conclusion is colorful and
blunt: "there is really only one pillar supporting Southland: legislative
history. It is truly a pillar of sand.

'22

is the enormously important question of whether the FAA is a procedural
statute governing only in federal court or substantive law governing in all
courts and preempting inconsistent state law. Ian Macneil argues convincingly that the FAA was originally understood to be a procedural statute governing only in federal court.

Id. at 197 n.8; see also Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1006-08 (1996) (describing the expansion of the FAA into state courts).
15 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
16 Id. at 83-147.
17 Id. at 121 (quoting Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 25 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
18 Id.
19 [d. at 117.
20 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.2, at 10:5.
21 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 140.
22 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.5.3, at 10:20.
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I agree that Chief Justice Burger's analysis in Southland of the
FAA's legislative history leaves much to be desired. But that is because
it is incomplete, not because the conclusion it reaches is wrong. In my
view, the Chief Justice reached the correct conclusion about the FAA's
legislative history: that "[a] lthough the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in
mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts."23 Contrary to Professor Macneil's analysis, there are "strong indications" in the legislative history that the
drafters of the FAA intended it to apply in state court, and that at least
some contemporaries of the Act so understood it. If, as Macneil argues, "what counts is largely the intentions of the reformers as known
to Congress, '2 4 then there is a strong argument that ChiefJustice Burger actually got it right.
The key points in my analysis are the following:
(1) Materials submitted to Congress by the principal drafter of
the FAA, Julius Henry Cohen, provide strong evidence that the FAA
was intended to apply in state court. In the materials, Cohen argued
that Congress had the power to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court. 25 The context of the argument makes clear that it

does not reflect merely a "wish in [Cohen's] heart of hearts" 26 or
"lawyerly caution," 27 as Macneil argues. Indeed, Cohen identified the
"primary purpose" of the FAA as making arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, implying that a secondary purpose of the
Act was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court.
(2) Cohen discussed Congress's power to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court not only in the materials he submitted to Congress, but also in two law review articles he co-authored
after the enactment of the FAA. 28 In addition, at least one other contemporaneous commentary, which Macneil does not mention, flatly
concludes that "[t]he act is broad enough to apply to actions commenced in state courts as well as to those instituted in federal courts,

23

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).

24 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.2, at 10:7. By "reformers," Macneil means
those advocating reform of arbitration laws. See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 25-30
(discussing sources of the reform movement). I commonly refer to the same group as
"supporters" of the FAA.
25

See infra Part III.C.1.

26

MACNEIL,

27

Id. at 223 n.61.

28

See infra text accompanying notes 279-95, 311-20.

supra note

15, at 114.
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and it was so intended by those who drafted it."29 Such statements
belie the commonly asserted notion that no one at the time the FAA
was enacted believed it applied in state court, either because arbitration matters were procedural or because it would have been too great
an infringement on state sovereignty.
(3) The vast majority of statements in the legislative history, relied on by Justice O'Connor and Professor Macneil to argue that the
FAA applies only in federal court, state simply that the FAA applies in
federal court, not that it applies only in federal court. 30 Given that
the "primary purpose" of the FAA was to make arbitration agreements
enforceable in federal court, such statements are not surprising. But
they do not exclude the possibility that the Act applies in state court as
well. Likewise, supporters' arguments that the Act was constitutional
based on Congress's power to establish rules of procedure in federal
court do not demonstrate that the Act applies only in federal court.
Because of doubts about the constitutionality of the FAA, its supporters relied on both Congress's power to regulate the federal courts and
its power to regulate interstate commerce. The applicability of the
Act in state court, by comparison, obviously could be grounded (and
was in fact grounded) solely on the commerce power. Finally, occasional statements in the legislative history to the effect that the FAA
does not infringe on the authority of the states to regulate arbitration
agreements, again read in context, refer not to section 2 of the FAA
but to provisions of the Act creating procedures for enforcing arbitra3
tion agreements in federal court, i.e., sections 3 and 4 of the Act. '
(4) The usual discussions of the historical setting of the FAA incorrectly focus on the fact that the Act predates the decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins. 32 Prior to Erie, arbitration was viewed as a proce-

dural matter governed by the law of the forum. On that view, the
decision in Erie transformed arbitration from a procedural matter to a
substantive one, and thus the FAA from a statute applicable only in
federal court to one applicable in state court. Instead, the more important historical reason for such transformation of the FAA as has
occurred is the post-New Deal expansion in the scope of Congress's
commerce power. Today, the FAA applies to a vastly wider array of
cases than it did in 1925, both in federal court and in state court.
Thus, the lack of opposition to the Act at the time of enactment is
29 See Alfred N. Heuston, The Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration, 1 WASH. L. REv.
243, 258 (1926); see infra text accompanying notes 326-32.
30 See infra Part III.C.
31 See infra Part II.C.
32 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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much less surprising than it otherwise might seem. 33 Likewise, a plausible reason for the lack of reported state court cases considering the
FAA for several decades after its enactment is the narrow reach of the
Act during much of that time.3 4 Indeed, the first reported state court
case to consider the FAA was decided in 1944, 35 only two years after
the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the scope of the
36
commerce power in Wickard v. Filburn.
To be clear: I do not claim that the legislative history of the FAA
unambiguously demonstrates that Congress intended the Act to apply
in state court. As Chief Justice Burger wrote in Southland, the legislative history is "not without ambiguities." 37 Instead, my argument is
more limited. First, I conclude that the legislative history does not
unambiguously demonstrate the opposite-i.e., it does not demonstrate that, as Professor Macneil has contended, the FAA applies only
in federal court. Second, in my view, construing the Act as applicable
in state court is more consistent with the legislative history-that is, it
leaves fewer ambiguities unexplained-than the Macneil interpreta38
tion.
Reexamining the legislative history of the FAA is not merely an
academic exercise, although certainly a proper understanding of historical events itself is valuable. Questions about Southlands legitimacy
33

See infra Part III.B.

34
35

See infra Part III.F.
French v. Petrinovic, 46 N.Y.S.2d 846 (City Ct. 1944), affd, 54 N.Y.S.2d 179

(App. Term 1945).
36 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
37 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
38 Of course this entire discussion assumes, as does Professor Macneil, the legitimacy both (1) of using legislative history in interpreting statutes and (2) of imputing
statements by supporters of the FAA to Congress. For a sample of the literature on
the first issue, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 3-47 (1997); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members
and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, FloorDebates, and
Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms,
Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation,66 U. CHI. L. REv. 671 (1999); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. R~v. 621 (1990);John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673 (1997); and Frederick
Schauer, Statutory Constructionand the CoordinatingFunction of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP.
CT. REv. 231. As for the second issue, the committee reports and floor debates concerning the FAA provide little insight into the applicability of the Act in state court.
As a result, the legislative history debate concerning the FAA is based almost exclusively on statements by the private parties-those outside of Congress-who drafted
the FAA and who testified in support of its enactment. My argument here assumes
that such materials are useful, at least in this case, and analyzes the materials
accordingly.
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continue to have important implications for American arbitration
law. 3 9 State judges continue to construe the FAA narrowly while reciting that Southland was wrongly decided. Advocates of legislation restricting pre-dispute arbitration agreements cite to Congress the
incorrectness of the Southland decision. At the same time, misinterpreting the legislative history of the FAA gives rise to the possibility
that some courts will adopt too broad a view of FAA preemption, unduly restricting state arbitration law.
Part I describes the Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative history of the FAA, both in Southland and in the Court's subsequent decision in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.40 Part II summarizes
Professor Macneil's criticism of the Southland majority's legislative history analysis. Part III reexamines the legislative history of the FAA in
detail, and concludes that Chief Justice Burger likely reached the correct conclusion in Southland. Finally, Part IV explains the significance
of properly interpreting the legislative history of the FAA.
I.

SOUTHLAND CORP. V. KEATING AND THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE

FAA

This Part describes the Supreme Court's competing interpretations of the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act. It first
presents the procedural history of Southland Corp. v. Keating,4 1 including the California state court opinions and a brief description of the
U.S. Supreme Court decision. Next, it examines the opinions in
Southland in more detail, focusing on the analysis of the FAA's legislative history in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion and in Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion. The Chief Justice found that the legislative history was "not without ambiguities," but concluded that it
nonetheless provided "strong indications" that the FAA applied in
state court. 42 By contrast, according to Justice O'Connor in dissent,
"One rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's,"
and "that history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress
viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in the federal
courts." 43 Finally, this Part examines the Court's subsequent decision

in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,44 in which the majority
39

'40
41
42
43
44

See infra Part IV.

513 U.S. 265 (1995).
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 25.
513 U.S. 265 (1995).
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reaffirmed

Southland on grounds of stare decisis, 45 while Justice

46
Thomas in dissent renewed the criticisms of Southland.
Based on the analysis in the Supreme Court opinions, Justices
O'Connor and Thomas plainly get the better of the legislative history
argument. But as Part IV will show, that is only because Chief Justice
Burger's opinion inadequately analyzed the legislative history, not because it reached the wrong conclusion.

A.

The Southland Case: "Another Chapter [in] the FAA's Already
Colorful History"47

Southland Corporation, the franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience
stores, was sued by a number of its franchisees in state court in California. The actions brought by individual franchisees were consolidated
with a class action brought by Richard D. Keating, another franchisee. 48 The franchisees alleged that Southland had misrepresented
certain information and failed to disclose other information in connection with the sale of its franchises. They raised a variety of state
and federal law claims, including a claim alleging that Southland had
violated the disclosure requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law. 49 Southland filed a petition to compel arbitration of
the franchisees' claims, including the Franchise Investment Law
50
claim, relying on an arbitration clause in the franchise agreement.
The trial court granted the petition to compel arbitration as to all the
claims except the Franchise Investment Law claim.
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court as to the
Franchise Investment Law claim and ordered all claims to arbitration.51 The court first held that, as a matter of state law, nothing in
the Franchise Investment Law precluded arbitration of claims arising
45 Id. at 271-73.
46 Id. at 286-93 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47 Southland, 465 U.S. at 35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
48 Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481, 484 & n.1 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd,
645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1

(1984).
49 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West 1977).
50 Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 484 & n.2 (reproducing text of arbitration clause).
51 Id. at 495. The court of appeal required the trial court, on remand, to consider whether the arbitration should proceed on a class-wide basis, and, if so, "to devise methods to safeguard the rights of absent class members to adequate
representation and in the event of dismissal or settlement." Id. at 490-92. See generally Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (2000) (examining class-wide arbitration proceedings).
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under the act. 52 Further, if the Franchise Investment Law were inter-

preted to preclude arbitration of claims arising under the act, it would
conflict with the FAA and be preempted.5 3 In so holding, the court of
appeal relied principally on a decision of the Washington Supreme
Court, which concluded that "'[t] he majority rule ... appears to be

that the act does apply and requires a state court to enforce an arbitra54
tion clause despite a contrary state law or policy."
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and
held that the Franchise Investment Law claim could not be arbitrated. 55 The court first found that claims under the Franchise Investment Law were not arbitrable as a matter of state law. It reasoned that
"[t] he evidence is persuasive that in drafting the Franchise Investment
Law California legislators looked to the Securities Act of 1933 as their
model," and the U.S. Supreme Court had held in Wilko v. Swan that
claims under the 1933 Securities Act were not arbitrable. 5 6 The court
then rejected Southland's argument that the FAA preempted the California nonarbitrability rule. Although finding "nothing in the legislative history of the statute to suggest that Congress considered its
application to state courts," the court nonetheless "assume[d] that
Congress intended to insulate interstate contracts from judicial hostility regardless of forum ... and to establish for such contracts certain
uniform rules of interpretation. '57 According to the court, however,
California's exclusion of Franchise Investment Law claims from arbitration neither "reflect[s] hostility toward arbitration" nor "constitute Es] an obstacle to the general enforcement of arbitration
agreements in a manner consistent with federal law."5 8 The court
concluded that it was "highly improbable" that "Congress intended,
through the FAA, to override state policies of that nature." 59
52 Keating, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 493-94.
53 Id. at 494.
54 Id. at 494-95 (quoting Allison v. Medicab Int'l, Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 382 (Wash.
1979)).
55 Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1198 (Cal. 1982), rev'd sub nom.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
56 Id. at 1198-200 (citing Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)). Wilko, of course,
was overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
57 Keating, 645 P.2d at 1202.
58 Id.
59 Id. The court directed the trial court on remand to consider whether classwide arbitration was appropriate on the facts of the case. Id. at 1209-10. The trial
court was to consider "not only the factors normally relevant to class certification, but
the special characteristics of arbitration as well." Id. at 1209.
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The U.S. Supreme Court found the case to be within its appellate
jurisdiction 60 and held that the FAA applied in state court and preempted the California law. 61 Chief Justice Burger wrote the majority

opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
63
Powell. 62 Justice O'Connor dissented, joined by Justice Rehnquist.
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part.64 Although
Justice Stevens agreed with Justice O'Connor's analysis of the legislative history, he was "persuaded that the intervening developments in
65
the law compel the conclusion" that the FAA applies in state court.
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens would have upheld the California statute
on the ground that the state's public policy against arbitration of
Franchise Investment Law claims was a "ground[ ] as exist[s] at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract" permitted under section
66
2 of the Act.

Central to both the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's dissent was the legislative history of the FAA. The following two sections
describe in detail their respective analyses of that legislative history.
B.

"Not Without Ambiguities":67 The Majority's Analysis of the FAA's
Legislative History

Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion began by discussing the
language of section 2 of the FAA and briefly considering Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin ManufacturingCo. 68 and Moses H. Cone MemorialHospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.69 It concluded by responding
to justice O'Connor's and Justice Stevens's opinions. The heart of the
majority opinion, however, was its analysis of the FAA's legislative
70
history.
60 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1984). The Supreme Court refused to consider Southland's argument that the FAA preempted the California rule

permitting class-wide arbitration. According to the Court, Southland relied only on
state law in opposing class-wide arbitration in the lower courts, and the California
Supreme Court did not rule on the federal law issue. Id. at 8-9 & n.3.
61

62
63
64
65
66
U.S.C.

67

Id. at 16.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 18-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 9
§ 2 (2000)).

Id. at 12.

68 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
69 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
70 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.5.3, at 10:19-:20 ("The decision in Southland putatively rests on two pillars: precedent, consisting of PrimaPaintand [Moses H.

112
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The majority's analysis began, "Although the legislative history is
not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress
had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts."' 7 1 The opinion found support in
three different parts of the legislative history.
First, it quoted House Report 96 as "plainly suggest[ing]" that
Congress intended "more comprehensive objectives" than adopting
rules applicable only in federal court: "[tlhe purpose of this bill is to
make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained
in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or
[sic] admiralty, orwhich may be the subject of litigation in the Federal
72

courts."

Although Burger explained the reference no further, the point of
the quotation is its suggestion that the FAA applies to contracts either
"involving interstate commerce" or "which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts." If the FAA did not apply in state court, the
House Report presumably would have used "and" instead of "or." By
describing the coverage of the act in the alternative, the House Report
suggests the possibility of contracts involving interstate commerce but
not the subject of litigation in federal court-thus, necessarily, in state
court.
Second, the majority opinion quoted two statements from the legislative history of the Act indicating that its purpose was to overcome
the common law's refusal to provide specific enforcement of arbitration agreements. The first quote was from the remarks of Senator
Walsh during the 1923 Senate Hearings on the Act, stating that the
Act "sought to 'overcome the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically enforce an[y] arbitration agreement.'-73 The second was from
House Report 96, noting the need for "'legislative enactment"' to
override this principle, which was "'firmly embedded"' in common
law precedent.7 4 Burger's opinion concluded, "Surely this makes
clear that the House Report contemplated a broad reach of the Act,
Cone], and legislative history. Since, however, both PrimaPaintand Moses Cone rest on

legislative history, there is really only one pillar supporting Southland: legislative history. It is truly a pillar of sand.").
71
Southland, 465 U.S. at 12.
72 Id. at 12-13 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (emphasis added and

alteration in original)).
73 Id. at 13 (quoting Sales and Contracts To Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
and Federal Commercial Arbitration:Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary,67th Cong. 6 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hearings] (remarks of Sen. Walsh))
(alteration in original).

74

Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924)).
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unencumbered by state-law constraints. '75 According to the majority,
the applicability of the Act to state courts "can also be inferred from
the reality that Congress would be less likely to address a problem
whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem of large
76
significance in the field of commerce."
Third, the majority opinion relied on Congress's asserted "awareness of the widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitration agreements . . . and that such [state] courts were bound by"
inadequate state arbitration laws. 77 In support of the first proposition,

the majority cited the 1923 Senate Hearings, presumably a statement
that some state courts have held arbitration agreements invalid. 78 In
support of the second proposition, the majority quoted a portion of
the testimony of W.H.H. Piatt at the 1923 Hearings, who described
"the arbitration statute of the state of Missouri" as providing for
"'technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate under the
method provided by the statute, you have an arbitration by statute[;]
but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing to do with validating the contract to
arbitrate.'-79 The majority summarized its legislative history analysis
as follows:
[t] he problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old common-law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitration agreements.
To confine the scope of the Act to arbitrations sought to be enforced in fe deral courts would frustrate what we believe Congress
intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope to meet the
80
large problems Congress was addressing.
Finally, the majority responded in two ways to Justice O'Connor's
argument (based on the legislative history) that the FAA was. a procedural statute applicable only in federal court. First, the majority ar-

gued that the interstate commerce requirement in section 2 of the
FAA made sense only if Congress intended the Act to apply in state
75

Id.

76 Id.
77 Id. at 13-14.
78 Id. at 13 (quoting 1923 Hearings, supra note 73, at 8 (testimony of Mr. Piatt))
("Some of our courts have held, I think notably Massachusetts not long ago, that an
agreement to arbitrate and to permit A and B to fix the fees of the arbitrators and so

make a final award is invalid, in that it invades the province of the court and sets up
another tribunal that is not provided by law, and in a sense, as some people put it, is

immoral.").
79 Id. at 14 (quoting 1923 Hearings, supra note 73, at 8 (testimony of Mr. Piatt))
(alteration in original).

80

Id.
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court; second, it contended that limiting the FAA to federal court
would "encourage and reward forum shopping."8' The majority acknowledged in footnotes that the FAA did not create federal subjectmatter jurisdiction8 2 and that only section 2 of the FAA, not sections 3
or 4, applied in state court.8 3
C. Justice O'Connor's Dissent and the "Clear CongressionalIntent
Underlying the FAA"

84

In dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority as "utterly
fail[ing] to recognize the clear congressional intent underlying the
FAA. Congress intended to require federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements." 8s 5 In a direct jibe at Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion, Justice O'Connor began her analysis of the
legislative history as follows:
[o] ne rarely finds a legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA's.
That history establishes conclusively that the 1925 Congress viewed
the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal courts,
derived, Congress believed, largely from the federal power to con86
trol the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Justice O'Connor's first argument was that Congress characterized the FAA as procedural and not substantive, and thus believed it
applicable only in federal court. She cited a number of statements as
to the procedural nature of the Act, both in the congressional materials and contemporaneous commentaries. She concluded that "Congress believed that the FAA established nothing more than a rule of
procedure, a rule therefore applicable only in the federal courts.

'8 7

Second, according to Justice O'Connor, "If characterizing the
FAA as procedural was not enough, the draftsmen of the Act, the
House Report, and the early commentators all flatly stated that the
Act was intended to affect only federal-court proceedings." '8 Again,
she cited excerpts from the congressional hearings and reports, as
81
82
83

Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 15 n.9.
Id. at 16 n.10.

84 Id. at 23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 22-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Black had made similar arguments almost twenty years earlier in PrimaPaint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 418-20 (1967) (concluding that "there are clear indications in the legislative history that the Act was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable

in state courts").
86

87
88

Southland, 465 U.S. at 25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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well as contemporaneous commentaries, including, for example, the
House Report on the proposed Act, which stated that "'It] he bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the
89
courts of the United States."'
Finally, Justice O'Connor looked to the "powers Congress relied
on in passing the Act" as support for limiting the FAA to federal
courts. 90 Although acknowledging the references in the legislative
history to Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, she contends that "[m]ore numerous, however, are the references to Congress's pre-Erie power to prescribe 'general law' applicable in all
federal courts." 9 1 So long as "Congress relied at least in part on its Art.
III power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts,"92 according to
Justice O'Connor, it demonstrates that Congress intended the FAA to
apply only in federal court.
Her conclusion from analyzing the legislative history was direct
and to the point:
[t]he foregoing cannot be dismissed as "ambiguities" in the legislative history. It is accurate to say that the entire history contains only
one ambiguity, and that appears in the single sentence of the House
Report cited by the Court .... That ambiguity, however, is definitively resolved elsewhere in the same House Report . . . and
93
throughout the rest of the legislative history.

Her opinion then proceeded to examine the structure of the
FAA, making two main points. First, Justice O'Connor noted that sections 3 and 4, the "implementing provisions" of the Act, apply only in
federal court. 94 Second, she asserted that the fact that the FAA does
not create federal subject-matter jurisdiction is further evidence that it
was to apply only in federal court. The dissent concluded, "Today's
decision is unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and, in
light of the FAA's antecedents and the intervening contraction of federal power, inexplicable. Although arbitration is a worthy alternative
95
to litigation, today's exercise in judicial revisionism goes too far.1

89

Id. at 27 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924)).

90
91
92
93

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

94
95

Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 36 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

27-28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28 n.14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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D. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: Reaffirming an "Edifice of
Its Own Creation"?96

The Supreme Court again considered whether the FAA applied
in state court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson.97 The principal
issue in Allied-Bruce was the interstate commerce nexus required for
the FAA to apply. The Court held that the Act extends to the full
reach of Congress's commerce power 98 and that a contract need involve only "commerce in fact," rejecting any requirement that at the
time of contracting the parties have "contemplated substantial interstate
activity."9 9 Although the Court acknowledged that "[t]he pre-New
Deal Congress that passed the Act in 1925 might well have thought
the Commerce Clause did not stretch as far as has turned out to be
the case," it relied on other cases in which it had decided that "the
scope of a statute should expand along with the expansion of the
Commerce Clause Power itself."' 0 0
Before reaching the interstate commerce issue, the Court considered a request by twenty state attorneys general that it overrule Southland."" The attorneys general devoted a significant portion of their
brief to a critique of the Southland majority's legislative history analysis, concluding that "the legislative history proves precisely the opposite of what the Southland majority believed."'10 2 In addition, the
attorneys general relied on the "powerful interests of federalism at
96

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
97 Id. at 265. Previously, the Court had applied Southland to hold that the FAA

preempted section 229 of the California Labor Code, which precluded arbitration of
a state law action for wages. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987). In dissent, Justice Stevens commented that "[i] t is only in the last few years that the Court

has effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend." Id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor likewise
dissented, adhering to her Southland dissent. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 273-77.
99 Id. at 277-80 (quoting Metro Indus, Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co.,
287 F.2d 382, 387 (1961)).
100 Id. at 275.

101

Id. at 272; see Brief of Amici Curiae Attorneys General of Alabama et al. in

Support of Respondents, Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265 (No. 93-1001). The states that

signed on to the brief were Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hamp-

shire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, and Vermont.
Id.
102 Brief of Amici Curiae Attorneys General of Alabama in Support of Respondents et al. at 11, Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 265 (No. 93-1001). While the brief cited
various commentators critical of the Southland decision, it did not cite Professor Macneil's book. See id. at 14-15 n.19.
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issue here,"' 0 3 arguing that Southland "dramatically alter[ed] the bal04
ance between federal and state judicial systems."'
The Allied-Bruce Court, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer,
rejected the request and reaffirmed Southland. In what Professors
Carrington and Haagen describe as an "almost apologetic opinion of
the Court,"10 5 the majority relied solely on the doctrine of stare decisis
to support its decision. The majority explained,
The Southland Court ...recognized that the pre-emption issue was
a difficult one, and it considered the basic arguments that respondents and amici now raise (even though those issues were not thoroughly briefed at the time). Nothing significant has changed in the
ten years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have eroded Southland's authority; and no unforeseen practical problems have arisen.
Moreover, in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts relying upon Southland as authority. Further, Congress, both
before and after Southland, has enacted legislation extending, not
retracting, the scope of arbitration. For these reasons, we find it
10 6
inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established law.
The majority did not revisit the FAA's legislative history.
Justice O'Connor concurred. She reiterated her view that "Congress never intended the Federal Arbitration Act to apply in state
courts," explaining that "over the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to
the Federal Arbitration Act, building instead, case by case, an edifice
of its own creation."' 0 7 On the basis of stare decisis, however, she "acquiesce [d]" in the judgment, calling on "Congress to correct this in08
terpretation if it wishes to preserve state autonomy in state courts."'

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 10 9 dissented. 110 Justice
Thomas flatly concluded that the decision in Southland was "wrong"
103
104
105

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
Carrington & Haagen, supra note 10, at 383.

106
107

Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272.
Id. at 283 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

108 Id. at 284 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109 Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissent, indicating that in the future he
would not dissent from judgments relying on Southland. Id. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissent-

ing). He made clear, however, that he "stand[s] ready to join four other Justices in
overruling [Southland], since Southland will not become more correct over time, the
course of future lawmaking seems unlikely to be affected by its existence, and the
accumulated private reliance will not likely increase beyond the level it has already

achieved (few contracts not terminable at will have more than a 5-year term)." Id.
110

Id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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and voted to overrule it. 111 Justice Thomas argued, as had Justice
O'Connor before him in Southland, that arbitration was viewed as a
procedural matter in 1925, and that "[i]t would have been extraordinary for Congress to attempt to prescribe procedural rules for state
courts."'

12

Given the historical background, which Justice Thomas de-

scribes in detail,"13 "no one"-Congress, commentators, or the
courts-construed the FAA as attempting to do So. 1 4 As for the legislative history itself, Justice Thomas largely relied on a citation to Justice O'Connor's Southland dissent,11 5 although he did cite several
contemporaneous commentaries and highlighted the lack of state
116
court cases addressing the FAA.
After Allied-Bruce, the Court applied Southland to hold preempted
a Montana statute that invalidated arbitration agreements formed
without conspicuous notice. ' 7 Only Justice Thomas dissented, relying on his dissent in Allied-Bruce.'1 8 Subsequently, while construing
narrowly the employment exception to the FAA, the Court in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams '1 9 rejected an argument "that a state statute
ought not be denied state judicial enforcement while awaiting the outcome of arbitration."' 1 20 The Court made clear that "[t] hat matter...
was addressed in Southland and Allied-Bruce, and we do not revisit the
21
question here."
II.

THE MACNEIL CRITIQUE OF SOUTHLAND'S
' 12 2
"PATHOLOGICAL HISTORY

The leading critic of Southland's legislative history analysis is Professor Ian Macneil, who in his book, American Arbitration Law, undertakes a detailed and thorough examination of the FAA's legislative
history.' 23 Unlike the majority and dissenting opinions in Southland,
Macneil's analysis presents a complete picture of that legislative his111
112
113
114

Id. at 285-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 287-88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

See infra text accompanying notes 169-71.
Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 288 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
25-29 (1984) (O'Connor,J., dissenting)).
116 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
117 Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
118 Id. at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
119 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
120 Id. at 124.
121 Id.
122 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 170.
123 Id. at 92-121.
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tory, considering not only those pieces that favor his interpretation
but also those that might cut against that interpretation. This Part
briefly summarizes Macneil's criticisms of the majority opinion in
Southland, which persuasively demonstrates the inadequacy of Chief
Justice Burger's analysis.
Macneil's critique is based on at least two underlying premises
about the FAA. These "premises" are not logical premises in the sense
that if disproven his argument fails. But they clearly color his legislative history analysis, and at several points he relies on these premises
as a reason to reject what he otherwise finds to be ambiguities in the
124
legislative history.

First, in Macneil's view, the FAA is "a comprehensive integrated
modern arbitration law containing everything needed for a complete
system of arbitration, other than the basic contract law underlying any
such system.' 1

25

He notes that the drafters of the FAA based the Act

on New York's state arbitration law, which also is an integrated statute.
Further, no arbitration law, according to Macneil, has included only
provisions making arbitration agreements "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" (sections 1 and 2 of the FAA) without also including provisions setting out the procedures governing enforcement (such as
sections 3 and 4 of the FAA). 126 "[G]iven that [Congress] was enacting an integrated statute," Macneil concludes, it "must also have
meant sections 1 and 2 to be applicable only in federal courts, in spite
of the generality of the language of those two sections when viewed
12 7
discretely."
Second, Macneil cites the lack of opposition to the FAA as a reason to believe it was not intended to apply in state court. No witnesses
opposed enactment of the FAA during the congressional hearings on
the bill, there was little discussion on the floor of the House or Senate,
and the bill passed unanimously. 128 If the FAA were intended to apply
in state court, Macneil argues, "it would have been viewed in 1925 as a
massive interference with state law." 129 Macneil explains:

[a] mandatory federal requirement that the state courts grant such
specific performance in cases involving interstate commerce would
have been a major and extraordinary expansion of federal power. It
would hardly have started another Civil War, but it would certainly
have been enough to cause an immense stir in legislative and legal
See infra text accompanying notes 208, 258.
supra note 15, at 102.
Id. at 106-07.

124
125
126

MACNEIL,

127

Id.

128

Id. at 101, 115.

129

Id. at 115.

120
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circles. This was particularly so in 1925, when only three of the
1 30
forty-eight states had modern arbitration statutes.
The interference with state law would be particularly pronounced, if, as Macneil contended, the FAA was an integrated statute
applicable in its entirety in state court. Macneil concludes, "Thus the
fact that there was no opposition to the [FAA] reinforces what all the
rest of the evidence makes patent: the [FAA] was intended to be applicable only in federal courts . ... 131
As for the legislative history itself, I will defer detailed consideration of Macneil's arguments for the next Part. Instead, I will summarize briefly Macneil's critique of the Southland majority's analysis.
Recall from Part I that Chief Justice Burger made three principal arguments based on the legislative history of the FAA. 13 2 Macneil
133
harshly criticizes each of those three arguments.
First, Macneil calls the majority's reliance on the word "or" in the
House Report-that the FAA was "to make valid and enforcible agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the
subject of litigation in the Federal courts"I 34-"pure and simple nonsense." 13 5 First, Macneil contends that the use of the word "or" in the
House Report "was in fact a simple clerical or typographical mistake,"'I3 6 an argument that I will examine in more detail in the next
section. 3 7v Second, he points out, quite correctly, that under Chief
Justice Burger's interpretation, the language must mean either that all
cases in federal court, even those that do not involve interstate commerce, are subject to the FAA-which would have implicitly overruled
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic C0.1 8-or that only cases in federal or state
court and involving interstate commerce are subject to the FAA130

Id.

131

Id. at 116.

132 See supra text accompanying notes 71-83.
133 Macneil also criticizes a quotation ChiefJustice Burger takes from Prima Paint,
which in turn quotes from the House Report to the effect that the FAA "is based

upon ... the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate commerce
and over admiralty."' MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 140 (quoting Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984)). For the relevant excerpt from the House Report, see
infra text accompanying note 261.
134 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 141 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (emphasis added by Macneil)).
135 Id.
136 Id.; see aLho id. at 118-19.
137 See infra text accompanying notes 257-60.
138 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
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which is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the sentence. 139 In
either case, Burger places too much weight on that single sentence in
the House Report.
Second, according to Macneil, Chief Justice Burger used "a collage of excerpts taken out of context" to argue that Congress was addressing a problem of large importance that could only be dealt with
by making the Act applicable in state court.1 40 As Macneil rightly argues, none of the excerpts quoted by the Chief Justice contains any
suggestion that the FAA applied in state court.
Third, as for Chief Justice Burger's final argument, which does at
least rely on references to state arbitration laws, Macneil argues that
the Chief Justice makes one failure of state law "quite artificially...
into two failures";1 4 1 relies on testimony from the 1923 Hearings to the
exclusion of testimony from the 1924 Hearings; and asserts as
"'problems' of state law" failings that "had never even been submitted
to Congress, much less addressed by it."1' 4 2 In short, ChiefJustice Burger's argument was, according to Macneil, "simply a figment of the
Chief Justice's imagination."'1 43 While I would not go so far as Professor Macneil, I agree that Chief Justice Burger's argument ultimately is
unpersuasive. It seems likely that the state law references were merely
intended to illustrate the sorts of limitations supporters sought to have
the FAA remedy, not that the FAA necessarily was intended to preempt those particular state laws. In addition, the supporters of the
FAA certainly recognized that state arbitration laws were necessary to
deal with the vast majority of cases in state court, which were not
within the scope of the FAA.
The influence of Macneil's book has been substantial. 14 4 It is
now the accepted wisdom that Congress intended the FAA to apply
139

MACNEIL,

140
141
142

Id. at 141.
Id. at 144.
Id.

143

Id.

144

See, e.g., Carrington & Haagen, supra note 10, at 380 (Macneil "amply demon-

supra note 15, at 118-19.

strated [that] the opinion of the Court was an extraordinarily disingenuous manipulation of the history of the 1925 Act"); Gorman, supra note 13, at 677 n.133 ("Southland
has been persuasively criticized as a perversion of the legislative history of the Act,

which rather clearly was intended to apply only to litigation in the federal courts.");
Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism:A State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. Rlv. 175, 182-83 (2002) (citing Macneil for proposition that
"the legislation's proponents sought a federal statute that would enact a pro-arbitration policy in federal courts," and concluding "[t] hat the Act was meant to extend only
to the validation and enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal courts is clear
from every direction"); G. Richard Shell, Federal Versus State Law in the Interpretation of
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only in federal court and not in state court. 145 The next Part reevaluates the evidence and makes the case that Chief Justice Burger should
have made in Southland.
III.

REEXAMINING THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE

FAA

Chief Justice Burger's analysis of the FAA's legislative history in
Southland provided an easy target for critics, such as Professor Macneil, who have persuasively demonstrated the weaknesses of Burger's
analysis. This Part reexamines that legislative history, with particular
(although not exclusive) focus on Professor Macneil's own analysis.
As noted above, Macneil's analysis has been exceptionally influential.
It also is remarkably upfront and candid-while concluding confidently that Chief Justice Burger's interpretation is wrong, it acknowledges possible ambiguities in the historical record. In my view, those
"ambiguities" support an alternative reading of the legislative history:
the drafters of the FAA intended the Act to apply in state court. This
Part explains my reasons for so concluding.
First, I describe briefly the text and structure of the FAA and the
historical context in which it was enacted. Then I proceed in detail
through all aspects of the history of the Act, including congressional
reports, hearings, and debates, and contemporary commentaries and
cases. Contrary to Professor Macneil's analysis, I conclude that in fact
ChiefJustice Burger reached the right conclusion in Southland. While
there certainly are ambiguities in the legislative history, "there are
Contracts ContainingArbitration Clauses: Reflections on Mastrobuono, 65 U. CINN. L. REV.
43, 51 n.33 (1996) ("[Macneil] demonstrated beyond doubt that the Southland
Court's account of the legislative history of the FAA is a pillar built entirely of 'sand'
and based largely on figments 'of the Chief Justice's imagination."'); see also LarryJ.
Pittman, The FederalArbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation,
Stare Decisis, and a Proposalfor Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 890 (2002) (finding "persuasive and substantial indications that Congress intended only that the FAA be a
procedural law that is applicable only in federal courts," but not citing Macneil).
Some commentators are more equivocal. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 350 (2d ed. 2001) ("It is, in truth, very
hard to figure out what Congress thought it was doing when it enacted the FAA in

1925."); Barbara Ann Atwood, Issues in Federal-StateRelations Under the FederalArbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 61, 83-84 (1985) (arguing that "determination of the Act's
preemptive effect is problematic"). For a very thoughtful article arguing that Southland was wrongly decided and should be overruled, see David S. Schwartz, Correcting
Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:The Supreme Court and the FederalArbitration
Act, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2003) (on file with author). Schwartz
adds some new twists to the critique of the Southland legislative history, which I address later in this Article, see infra notes 243, 343, and he emphasizes the federalism
implications of Southland.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
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strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal
courts."

146

A.

Text and Structure

The FAA as enacted in 1925 is virtually identical to Chapter 1 of
the FAA as in force today. 14 7 Section 1 of the Act defines "maritime
transactions" and "commerce," phrases used in section 2, and then
8
excludes certain employment contracts from the scope of the Act.1 4
Section 2, the provision the Southland Court held applicable in state
court, provides as follows,
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
149
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
The language of section 2 broadly makes "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable" both pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements.
Nothing in the language of the section limits its application to cases in
the federal courts.
By contrast, the remaining sections of the FAA by their terms apply only in federal court. Section 3 provides for stays pending arbitration in "any of the courts of the United States," 15 0 while section 4
authorizes a petition to compel arbitration in "any United States dis146

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).

147 Sections 15 and 16 of the FAA, as well as Chapters 2 and 3, have been added
since 1925. The rest remains almost identical to the FAA as originally enacted, except

as changed to reflect the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 1
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 5.3.1, at 5:6 n.2.
148 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). The employment exception provides that "nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or
any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. In Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adanis, the Supreme Court held that "Section 1 exempts from the
FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers," rejecting the argument
that the provision excludes all employment contracts from the Act. 532 U.S. 105, 119
(2001).
149 9 U.S.C. § 2.
150 Id. § 3. The phrase "courts of the United States" does not include state courts,
but rather means only federal courts. See Southland,465 U.S. at 29 n.18 (O'Connor,J.,
dissenting); Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 144, at 183 n.30.
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trict court." 15 1 Under section 5, which deals with appointing arbitra-

tors, "the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or
arbitrators." 15 2 Section 6 addresses the procedure applicable to
"[a]ny application to the court hereunder.' 153 Although neither section specifies federal courts, from the context it seems clear that is
what was intended. By contrast, section 7 permits a petition to compel
attendance at an arbitration proceeding to be filed in "the United
States district court for the district in which such arbitrators . . .are

sitting," 15 4 and section 8 deals with cases brought in federal court on
the basis of admiralty jurisdiction. 55 Sections 9 through 11 set out
procedures for enforcing and challenging arbitral awards. All three
sections permit actions in "the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made," 156 while sections 12 and 13 deal
15 7
with the procedures in such actions.
Macneil argues that "[t] he structure of the [FAA] reveals an unquestionably integrated, unitary statute, consisting of core provisions
and provisions supplementing them."' 5 8 New York state arbitration

law was the source for the FAA; the New York arbitration law applied
only in New York and did not purport to "bind[ ] courts of jurisdictions other than New York."' 5 9 Moreover, no other arbitration law at
the time (or since, according to Macneil) applies differently in differentjurisdictions. Thus, Macneil concludes, "[a]ny reading of the...
[FAA] leading to substantive and procedural parts with different applicability creates a monstrosity found nowhere else in the world of
60
American arbitration."'
I disagree. As the above description of the FAA demonstrates,
the language of the Act supports construing section 2 to apply more
broadly than the rest of the Act. Section 2 alone by its terms applies to
maritime transactions and transactions in interstate commerce, which
could cover proceedings both in federal and state court. The rest of
the Act creates procedures applicable only in federal court. I do not
suggest that the language of the Act requires this interpretation, but it
certainly is a plausible one.
151 9 U.S.C. § 4.
152 Id. § 5.
153

Id. § 6.

154
155

Id. § 7.
Id. § 8.

156
157
158

Id. § 11; see also id. §§ 9-10.
Id. §§ 12-13.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 105-06.

159

Id. at 106.

160

Id. at 107.
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Moreover, the fact that the FAA is based on New York arbitration
law-which does not bind courts other than New York courts-does
not show that the FAA likewise applies only in a single jurisdiction.
Macneil disregards a key distinction between the New York arbitration
law and the FAA: the drafters of the FAA inserted the phrase "maritime transactions and contracts evidencing a transaction involving
commerce" into section 2. Obviously, no such jurisdictional nexus
was present in the original New York law. 161 Plainly, the drafters of
the FAA knew that they were drafting a statute for a federal system, in
which federal law is supreme over state law. Their use of the New
York model does not demonstrate that section 2 is limited to a single
jurisdiction, i.e., federal court. Finally, it is not surprising that there is
no similar statute elsewhere in American arbitration law, since the
FAA was designed to be enacted by the national government in a fed162
eral system, while other arbitration laws are enacted by the states.
At bottom, neither the language of the FAA nor its drafting origins support treating it as a unitary statute either wholly applicable in
state court or not applicable at all. Instead, while most of the Act
plainly applies only in federal court, section 2 by its terms is broader,
and applies to all maritime transactions and transactions in interstate
commerce. Nothing in section 2 limits its application to federal court,
which, as subsequent sections explain, is what the Act's drafters
intended.
B. Historical Setting
Congress enacted the FAA, which was then called the United
States Arbitration Act, in 1925. As described in detail by Macneil, the
Act was the product of years of drafting and lobbying by business
groups and the ABA. 163 The ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade
161

1920 N.Y. Laws 275, quoted in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E.

288, 289 (1921).

162

That sections 3 and 4 of the FAA do not apply in state court does not mean

that a state, consistent with the Act, could refuse specific performance of arbitration

agreements. Such a rule likely would be preempted by section 2 to the extent it
"would effectively nullify the federal right." See Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of
the United States Arbitration Act: A Farragoof Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy, 69
L.J. 847, 865 (1960). But see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,

YALE

293 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding "no textual basis for Southlands suggestion that § 2 requires the States to enforce [arbitration] agreements through the rem-

edy of specific performance").
163 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 84-101.
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and Commercial Law prepared the original draft of the bill, and Congress enacted it into law with only minor amendments.1 6 4
The usual point of emphasis in describing the history of the FAA
is that it was enacted while Swift v. Tyson 1 65 was still good law. At the
time, rules governing the enforcement of arbitration agreements were
seen as procedural, not substantive, and so were governed by the law
of the forum. Accordingly, federal courts would not apply state arbitration statutes, and a federal arbitration statute was necessary to make
arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court. Only after Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins I66 was decided-indeed, not until the Supreme
Court's 1956 decision in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co.167-did the Court
recognize the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate as substantive
matters to be governed by state law in federal diversity cases beyond
168
the scope of the FAA.
Justice Thomas, in his dissent in Allied-Bruce, stated the implications of this usual story for the Southland majority's analysis:
[a]t the time'of the FAA's passage in 1925, laws governing the enforceability of arbitration agreements were generally thought to
deal purely with matters of procedure rather than substance, because they were directed solely to the mechanisms for resolving the

underlying disputes .... It would have been extraordinary for Congress to attempt to prescribe procedural rules for state courts. And
because the FAA was enacted against this general background, no
169
one read it as such an attempt.
Thomas explained further that the reason federal courts "refused to
apply state arbitration statutes in cases to which the FAA was inapplicable" 171 was
not the outgrowth of this Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson, which

held that certain categories of state judicial decisions were not 'laws'
for the purposes of the Rules of Decision Act and hence were not
binding in federal courts; even under Swift, state statutes unambiguously constituted 'laws.' Rather, federal courts did not apply the

164 Id. at 84-91.
165 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
166 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
167 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
168 Id. at 203-04.
169 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 286-88 (1995) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
170 Id. at 288.
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state arbitration statutes because the statutes were not considered
substantive laws. 171

In short, when it enacted the FAA in 1925, the story goes, Congress
would not have considered the Act as applicable in state court because
the subject of the Act was procedural and thus to be governed by state
arbitration laws.
But this story only proves so much. The most important implication of the procedural nature of arbitration statutes was that state arbitration laws did not apply in federal court. 172 As a result, the FAA was
necessary to make arbitration agreements enforceable in cases in federal court. Thus, the references in the FAA's legislative history to the
procedural nature of arbitration statutes, as will be seen below, are
used to explain the Act's application in federal court, not used to
demonstrate its inapplicability in state court. But the fact that arbitration statutes were procedural did not preclude Congress from making
arbitration statutes enforceable in state court, as the supporters of the
Act informed Congress.173 Instead, the procedural nature of arbitration statutes provided an additional constitutional basis on which Congress could rely in enacting the FAA-its power to regulate procedure
in the federal courts.
Moreover, this story ignores another historical sea change that
transformed the FAA in more significant ways than Erie: the dramatic
expansion of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. The
FAA was enacted in 1925, seven years after the Court in Hammer v.
Dagenhart struck down a congressional statute prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods made with child labor. 174 The New Deal
transformation of congressional power was more than a decade away.
Thus, although some precedent at the time might have provided support for a broader interpretation of the commerce power, 175 the
Court did not build on that precedent until well after the FAA was
176
enacted.
171 Id.; see also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 144, at 191 ("[1I]n 1925 a congressional attempt to eradicate state animosity toward arbitration would have usurped
jurisdictional boundaries.").
172 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 132-33.
173 See infra Parts III.C.1-2.
174 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
175 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the NationalEconomy, 1933-1946, 59
I-Av. L. Rv. 645, 647 (1946).
176 Rotunda and Nowak describe the state of Commerce Clause doctrine prior to
the New Deal as follows:
[a]s we turn to the period of the New Deal, we can see several distinct lines
of decisions regarding the commerce power. Under the Shreveport Rate Case,
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The narrow scope of the commerce power when the FAA was enacted is shown by the following exchange in the 1923 Hearingson the
bill. In response to Senator Walsh's assertion that insurance contracts
are not entered into voluntarily because they are offered on a take-itor-leave-it basis, W.H.H. Piatt, one of the supporters of the Act, stated
that "it is not the intention of this bill to cover insurance cases.' 77 At
the time, of course, in Paul v. Virginia1 78 and subsequent cases, the
Supreme Court had held that "[t] he business of insurance is not commerce" 179 and so was beyond Congress's power to regulate. As Professor Macneil himself has stated: "In 1925 narrow views of the scope of
interstate commerce prevailed, and countless important transactions
in state courts would have remained uncovered by a modern arbitration act, even with such an extension."'8 °
The New Deal expansion of the commerce power began in 1937
with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,81 which adopted a much
broader interpretation of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. Not until 1941 did Congress overrule Hammer v. Dagenhart.182
In 1942, the Court decided Wickard v. Filburn,'8 3 with its broad extension of the commerce power to a wholly in-state transaction that,
when "taken together with that of many others similarly situated," had
184
a sufficient effect on interstate commerce.
Thus, at the time it was enacted, the FAA did not dramatically
alter the federal-state balance when it made certain arbitration agreements enforceable in state court, at least not to the degree it does now
under modern conceptions of the commerce power. Subsequent
Congress could regulate activities which had an economic effect on commerce among the states. The Court, however, did not apply this theory beyond the railroad regulation cases. The Court had also allowed the
regulation of single-state activities which were a part of the stream or current
of commerce, but this theory required a tangible connection of the activity
to interstate commerce. The Court would allow other regulation of commerce only if the subject matter had a "direct" effect on interstate commercial transactions.
1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.NOWAK,TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.6, at 388 (2d ed. 1992).
177

1923 Hearings, supra note 73, at 9 (testimony of Mr. Piatt).

178 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
179 N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 508 (1913); Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648, 655 (1895).
180 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 234 n.85; see also Hayford & Palmiter, supra note
144, at 192.

181

301 U.S. 1 (1937).

182
183
184

See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 128.
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events have changed that: in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson185 the
Supreme Court held that the current broad conception of the commerce power, not the narrow conception prevailing at the time of enactment, governs under the FAA.' 86 Subsequently, the Court in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams' 87 construed the employment exception to the FAA narrowly, as limited essentially to transportation workers.1 88 Thus, the reason for the transformation of the FAA is not, as
usually argued, the decision in Erie,189 but the expansion in Congress's commerce power since its enactment? 9°
As a result, extending the FAA to state courts would not, at the
time, have resulted in the dramatic expansion of federal authority that
Macneil suggests. Certainly there were questions about the constitutionality of the Act, and Congress's authority to extend the Act to state
courts was shakier than its authority to make the Act applicable in
federal court. 19 ' But it is not as surprising that there was little or no
opposition to the Act on federalism grounds as it might otherwise
seem with modern hindsight.
Moreover, the narrow understanding of the commerce power at
the time offers at least a partial explanation for the twenty-year gap
between enactment of the FAA and the first reported state court case
considering the Act. Because of the narrow conception of the commerce power, and thus the scope of the FAA, the vast majority of cases
to which it applied were in federal court; few were in state court. Indeed, even in federal court, early commentators concluded, "The
greater number of arbitration agreements that federal courts will, in

185
186
187
188

513 U.S. 265 (1995).
Id. at 275.
532 U.S. 105 (2001).
Id. at 114-15.

189 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie and its progeny may well
have led to the rediscovery of the FAA's applicability in state court. See Linda R.
Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L.

REV. 1305, 1308-37 (1985) (tracing effect of Erie on interpretations of FAA).
190 The expansion of the commerce power likewise explains the much criticized
application of the FAA to consumer contracts. At the time the FAA was enacted, most
consumer contracts would not have had a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce for
the Act to apply. Thus, the support for the proposed Act was from merchants (and
lawyers) who wanted to make arbitration agreements among merchants enforceable.
As the Supreme Court has construed the commerce power more broadly and consumer transactions have become more national in scope, the FAA has come to cover
increasing numbers of consumer transactions.
191

See Heuston, supra note 29, at 258.
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all likelihood, be called upon to enforce, will fall within the scope of
192
the state laws."
The key to understanding the legislative history of the FAA, then,
is not in its historical setting, but in the congressional materials themselves. I now turn to these materials.
C.

CongressionalMaterials

This section analyzes in detail the congressional materials that
make up the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act. Those
materials consist of hearings in 1923 and 1924, a House report and a
Senate report, and "exceptionally meagre" floor debates.1 93 Congress
itself had little to say about the FAA, and the Act as passed was virtually
19 4
identical to the original bill as drafted and approved by the ABA.
Thus, Macneil argues,
It must always be remembered that the FAA drafts were presented
to Congress in whole cloth by reformers acting through the A.B.A.
The FAA was thus not a bill manufactured in Congress. The legislative history of the FAA can, therefore, be understood only in terms
of what Congress understood was being presented to it, rather than
in the more usual terms, i.e., what Congress thought it was creating
and presenting to the nation. This is a subtle but important difference, since what counts is largely the intentions of the reformers as
known to Congress. Only from them can the intentions of the legis19 5
lators be inferred.
The analysis that follows is roughly in chronological order, with one
major exception-the brief in support of the Act, submitted by Julius

Henry Cohen at the 1924 congressional hearings, with which I begin.
1.

Cohen Brief
The author of the first draft of the FAA was Julius Henry Cohen,

general counsel for the New York Chamber of Commerce and member of the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial
197
Law. 19 6 In addition to testifying at the 1924 Hearings on the Act,
192 Harry Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 428, 445 (1931).
193 Id. at 429.

194

See supra text accompanying notes 163-64.

195 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.2, at 10:7; see also Pittman, supra note 144,
at 824-25. I proceed on that assumption as well. See supra note 38.
196 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 85.
197

For Cohen's

249-54.

testimony at the hearing, see infra text accompanying notes
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Cohen submitted a brief at the hearings, which is reprinted in its entirety in the hearing transcript. 198 Cohen incorporated portions of
the brief in subsequent articles that he published in the ABA Journal1 99 and the Virginia Law Review,2 00 explaining the Act. According
to Macneil, "[t]his brief is one of the most important aspects of the
legislative history of the [FAA]."201 Based on the Cohen Brief, Macneil concludes: "Had there ever been any doubt-there was not-concerning the limitation of the [FAA] to the federal courts, Cohen's
brief certainly would have removed it."202
I agree with Professor Macneil that the Cohen Brief is an extremely important piece of the FAA's legislative history, but for the
opposite reason. It is important because the Cohen Brief is the
strongest evidence there is that the supporters of the FAA believed
that the Act applied in state court and communicated that belief to
Congress. If, as Macneil says, "what counts is largely the intentions of
the reformers as known to Congress," 20 3 then this brief is strong evi204
dence that Congress intended the FAA to apply in state court.
The key section of the brief is its discussion of Congress's power
to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court. I will begin by considering that section, and then will address the rest of the
brief. Because of its importance, I reproduce that section of the Cohen Brief at length:
[s]o far as the present law declares simply the policy of recog-

nizing and enforcing arbitration agreements in the Federal courts it
does not encroach upon the province of the individual States. It
seems probable, however, that Congress has ample power to declare
that all arbitration agreements connected with interstate commerce
198 See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes:Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and HR.
646 Before the Subcomms. of the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 33-41 (1924) [hereinafter 1924
Hearings] (brief submitted to committee by Julius Henry Cohen [hereinafter Cohen
Briefi).
199 Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA, The United States Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153 (1925); see infra text accompanying
notes 279-95.
200 Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA.
L. REv. 265 (1926); see infra text accompanying notes 311-20.
201 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 97.
202 Id. at 114; see also id. at 97 ("If there were ever any doubt about congressional
understanding as to what it was doing respecting the applicability of the act, this brief
would remove that doubt.").
203 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.2, at 10:7.
204 See Atwood, supra note 144, at 77, 83 ("Cohen's concern over the potential
reach of the commerce power suggests that the drafters intended the basic mandate
of enforceability to apply to state courts ifCongress had power to support such an
application.").
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or admiralty transactions shall be recognized as valid and enforcible
even by the State courts. In both cases the Federal power is supreme. Congress may act at its will, and having acted, no law or
regulation of a State inconsistent with the congressional act can be
given any force or effect even in the courts of the State itself. They
are as much bound to carry out the provisions of such a Federal
statute as though it was an act of their own legislature. This rule is
so well settled that it is no longer subject to question or
discussion ....

It is not only the actual and physical interstate shipment of
goods which is subject to the interstate commerce powers of the
Federal Government, but these powers govern every agency or act
which bears so close a relationship to interstate commerce that they
can reasonably be said to affect it. Contracts relating to interstate
commerce are within the regulatory powers of Congress ....
The only questions which apparently can be raised in this connection are whether the failure to enforce an agreement for arbitration imposes such a direct burden upon interstate commerce as
seriously to hamper it or whether the enforcement of such a clause
is of material benefit. If either of these questions can be answered
in the affirmative, we believe it to be beyond question that Congress
can legislate concerning the matter.
Even if, however, it should be held that Congress has no power
to declare generally that in all contracts relating to interstate commerce arbitration agreements shall be valid, the present statute is
not materially affected. The primary purpose of the statute is to
make enforcible in the Federal courts such agreements for arbitration, and for this purpose Congress rests solely upon its power to
20 5
prescribe the jurisdiction and duties of the Federal courts.
At a minimum, the discussion belies the notion that no one at the
time even considered the possibility that the FAA applied in state
court. Here, Cohen not only considers that possibility, but argues that
Congress has the power to so act.
More importantly, the clear import of this excerpt is that the FAA
was intended to apply in state court. Cohen argues that "so far as" the
Act applies in federal courts, "it does not encroach upon the province
of the individual states." Cohen thus implies that "so far as" the Act
applies in state courts, it does encroach on the province of the states,
and Congress has the power to do so. The last paragraph of the excerpt confirms this reading. The clause-"[e]ven if. . . it should be
held that Congress has no power" to regulate arbitration agreements
in state court-necessarily supposes litigation over that issue, litigation
205

Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 38.
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that would not occur unless the FAA applied in state court. Moreover,
a holding of unconstitutionality would "not materially affect[ ]" the
statute (although it would affect it immaterially), according to Cohen,
because the "primary purpose" of the Act was to make arbitration
agreements enforceable in federal court. Thus, making arbitration
agreements (at least those in interstate commerce) enforceable in
state court is, while not the primary purpose, at least a secondary purpose of the statute. The reason for the lack of any "material" effect is,
as discussed above, 20 6 the narrow reach of Congress's commerce
power at the time.
Macneil acknowledges that " [t]he first sentence of this paragraph
taken by itself contains a slight ambiguity." 20 7 He explains,
"So far as" can be*interpreted to mean that the proposed statute
does something more than govern the federal courts. The phrase
also can be interpreted as simply laying a ground for the proposition that since Congress could control the state courts under the
commerce and admiralty clauses the proposed bill, even though
limited to federal courts, has an additional constitutional support.
Taken out of context, the former might seem the more reasonable
20 8
interpretation; in context it is a most unreasonable one.
Macneil then dismisses this portion of the Cohen Brief as reflecting
either "lawyerly caution" 20 9 or "Cohen's undoubted wish in his heart
2 10
of hearts to see arbitration agreements enforceable everywhere."
Macneil's first reason for rejecting the obvious interpretation of
this language is that it is inconsistent with what Cohen writes elsewhere in the brief. I will deal with that question in detail shortly.
Macneil's other explanations for the language are even less convincing. Perhaps Cohen did "wish in his heart of hearts" that the Act
would be enforceable in state court. But by expressing that "wish" in
the materials he submitted to Congress (and in subsequent publications discussing the Act), 2 11 it was no longer merely in his "heart of
hearts." Instead, Cohen was stating his understanding that the statute
206

See supra text accompanying notes 174-90.

207
208
209

MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 114.

Id. at 223 n.60.
Id. at 223 n.61 ("Mr. Cohen's insertion of this additional constitutional author-

ity for congressional enactment of the statute is more likely attributable to lawyerly
caution than it is to any attempt to slip in by the back door a major change in the
statute, one contrary to everything else he said about it.").
210 Id. at 114; see also Schwartz, supra note 144 (manuscript at 17 n.61, on file with
author) (characterizing language as Cohen merely "float[ing] a hopeful trial
balloon").
211 See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
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did, in fact, apply in state court. Moreover, Macneil's suggestion of
"lawyerly caution" is inconsistent with Macneil's argument elsewhere
in the book-that making the FAA applicable in state court would
have prompted substantial opposition to the Act. 2 12 If, in fact, there

would have been as much opposition to having the FAA apply in state
courts as Macneil has asserted, "lawyerly caution" would dictate the
opposite of what Cohen did. Cohen would have bent over backwards
to deny that the FAA applied in state court rather than raising the
possibility that it did. Cohen made no such denial.
At bottom, Macneil interprets this section of the Cohen Brief as
"simply noting that Congress probably could require state courts to
enforce arbitration agreements in interstate commerce or admiralty,
not that this proposed statute does sO. ''213 Macneil asserts that this "is
made clear in the paragraphs following, particularly" the last paragraph quoted above, in which Cohen states that the "primary purpose" of the Act is to make arbitration agreements enforceable in
federal court. 2 14 Macneil merely quotes the paragraph without expla-

nation. 215 But the paragraph is contrary to Macneil's interpretation:
that the "primary purpose" of the Act is directed toward federal courts
suggests that the secondary purpose of the Act is directed toward state
courts. Macneil simply does not consider this obvious reading of the
Cohen Brief, which supports, rather than undercuts, a finding that
the FAA applies in state court.
Macneil seeks to overcome the plain meaning of this section of
the Cohen Brief based on context-what Cohen says about the FAA in
the rest of the brief. But the rest of the brief is fully consistent with
interpreting the FAA as applying in state courts.
The first sentence of the brief states that "[a] t the last session of
Congress, there was introduced a bill which would make valid, and
enforceable by the Federal courts, certain agreements for arbitration. ' 216 That description of the bill is accurate, of course. In fact, the
qualifier "by the Federal courts" modifies only "enforceable," not
"valid." Even disregarding the comma after "valid," nothing suggests
that the description purports to be exclusive, i.e., that the bill only
applies in federal court.
The brief then describes the provisions of the proposed Act, beginning with sections 1 and 2:
212

See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.

213

MACNEIL,

214
215

See supra text accompanying note 205.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 114.

216

Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 33-34.

supra note 15, at 114.
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[b]y a bill a provision for arbitration contained in any contract
which involved maritime transactions (matters which would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction) and interstate commerce as
generally defined is made "valid, enforceable and irrevocable," except upon the grounds for which any contract may be revoked. The
same rules apply to a submission to arbitration of an existing controversy. (Secs. 1 and 2.)217
Nothing in the description of these sections, just as nothing in
sections 1 and 2 of the FAA, limits the reach of the provisions to federal court. By comparison, the next paragraph of the brief describe
sections 3 and 4 of the Act, which plainly do apply only in federal
court, as the description makes clear:
[t]he Federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce such
agreements whenever under the Judicial Code they would normally
have jurisdiction of a controversy between the parties .... There

are two possible steps in such enforcement. First, any suit commenced in a Federal court upon an issue referable to arbitration
may be stayed until arbitration is had, unless the applicant for the
stay is in default with the arbitration. (Sec. 3.) Secondly, the court
may order the arbitration to proceed in accordance with the agreement, appointing an arbitrator itself, if appointment under the
agreement can not be had. (Secs. 4 and 5.)218

217

Id. at 34.

218

Id. The first sentence of this excerpt indicates that the FAA (as ultimately en-

acted) does not extend federal subject-matter jurisdiction to cases that could not already have been brought in federal court. Justice O'Connor in Southland, among
others, argues that "this puzzle"-of Congress creating a "federal substantive right
that cannot be enforced in federal court under the jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331"-indicates "that in 1925 Congress did not believe it was creating a substantive
right at all." Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 30 n.19 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In fact, as proposed, the FAA would have eliminated any amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity cases under the Act, effectively extending federal
jurisdiction over actions to enforce arbitration agreements and awards. See S. 1005,
68th Cong. § 8 (1924), reprintedin 1924 Hearings,supra note 198, at 3. That the extension of jurisdiction was to be based on diversity rather than federal question jurisdiction is not surprising given that the discussions of the bill focused on interstate
businesses. The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, deleted section 8 without explanation, see S. REP. No. 68-536, at 1 (1924), and the provision was not part of the
FAA as passed by Congress. Macneil argues that the deletion of section 8 "reflects the
intention of the A.B.A. (and of Congress) that the [FAA] be applicable only in federal
court" because "[t]he provision would have been largely unnecessary if the act governed state as well as federal courts." MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 105. That is not so,
as discussed infra text accompanying notes 319-20.
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Thus, Macneil's reliance on the first and third sentences of this quotation 219 is misplaced. The paragraph is discussing only section 3 of the
FAA, not section 2. Thus, these paragraphs do not indicate that the
FAA applies only in federal court; if anything, they suggest the
opposite.
As one of the justifications for the Act ("the evil to be corrected"), 220 the brief then describes the unenforceability of arbitration agreements in many of the states:
[b]ecause of the fact that in New York and New Jersey, in the
United States and in many foreign countries with whom the United
States has a large number of commercial transactions, arbitration
agreements are enforceable, while in the remainder of the United
States they are not enforceable, parties who reside in the jurisdictions recognizing arbitration agreements are at a disadvantage compared with those residing in jurisdictions where they are not
enforceable. The party residing in the first class of jurisdictions is
bound to respond to his agreement, either voluntarily or under the
order of the court. His coparty, residing in the second class ofjurisdictions, may refuse as arbitrarily or dishonestly as he pleases to
carry out his agreement, and his coparty has no remedy against him,
22 1
except through an ordinary action in the courts.
The solution, according to Cohen, is as follows:
[t]o meet the situation where, through dishonesty or mistake
or otherwise, one party to an arbitration agreement refuses to perform it, statutes such as those adopted in New York and New Jersey
are advocated and have met favor. To correct the same defect and
also to assure justice where one of the parties lives in a State not
recognizing arbitration agreements, the present Federal statute is
222
proposed.
Macneil does not cite or quote this excerpt, even though it might be
read to suggest that the FAA is designed to deal with cases in federal
court (where there would be diversity jurisdiction) and state arbitration laws would deal with cases in state court. Given the narrow reach
of the federal commerce power, as described above, 223 state arbitration statutes would be necessary to deal with the vast bulk of cases in
state court. And the FAA obviously applies in federal court. But nothing in this excerpt excludes the possibility that the FAA also applies to
219
220
221
222

MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 112.
Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
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See supra text accompanying notes 174-90.
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the relatively small number of cases (at that time) in state court within
the scope of the federal commerce power.
The next section of the Cohen Brief, the "Legal Justification" for
the Act, begins by listing the relevant constitutional provisions, including both the Commerce Clause and Congress's power to establish federal courts. 224 The next two paragraphs then state,
It has been suggested that the proposed law depends for its
validity upon the exercise of the interstate-commerce and admiralty
powers of Congress. This is not the fact.
The statute as drawn establishes a procedure in the Federal
courts for the enforcement of arbitration agreements. It rests upon
the constitutional provision by which Congress is authorized to establish and control inferior Federal courts. So far as congressional
acts relate to the procedure in the Federal courts, they are clearly
within the congressional power. This principle is so evident and so
225
firmly established that it can not be seriously disputed.
Again, Macneil quotes both of these paragraphs as evidence that
the FAA applies only in federal court. 22 6 Again, they do not support
such a conclusion. First, the excerpt states that the statute "establishes
a procedure in the Federal courts for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements." That it most certainly does-section 2 makes arbitration
clauses enforceable, and sections 3 and 4 establish a procedure in Federal courts for enforcement. Nothing in the statement excludes application of section 2 in state court.
Second, the brief notes the two possible sources of constitutional
authority for the Act-the Commerce Clause and Congress's power to
establish lower federal courts-and states that the constitutionality of
the FAA does not "depend [ ] for its validity" on the commerce power.
Macneil (and Justices O'Connor and Thomas) take the fact that Congress in enacting the FAA relied on its power to regulate the federal
courts as demonstrating that it did not intend the FAA to apply in
state court. But that is incorrect. In this excerpt, Cohen made clear
that the FAA-as it applies in federal court-is based on both the
commerce power and the power to regulate the federal courts. He
recognized that there were questions about whether the Act was constitutional, and not surprisingly offered alternative sources of Congressional authority for the Act. Thus, the Act does not "depend" on
the commerce power, because there is an alternative source of authority on which Congress also relied. But Cohen does not assert that the
224
225
226

Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 37.
Id.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 112.
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commerce power is irrelevant to the constitutionality of the Act as applicable in federal court. And, regardless, nothing in the discussion
here even purports to address the constitutional authority for Congress to make the FAA applicable in state court, which, as already discussed, 227 Cohen attributes solely to the commerce power.
Third, the paragraph sets the context for the next several
paragraphs of the brief. Those paragraphs, as does this one, deal with
the FAA as it applies to the federal courts. Read in context, references
in the next several paragraphs to the fact that the FAA will not affect
the states are references to the extent to which the Act regulates the
federal courts. The references do not address the effect of section 2
on state courts.
Thus, the brief continues in the following passage (the first paragraph of which is quoted by Macneil),228
A Federal statute providing for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements does relate solely to procedure of the Federal courts. It
is no infringement upon the right of each State to decide for itself
what contracts shall or shall not exist under its laws. To be sure
whether or not a contract exists is a question of the substantive law
of the jurisdiction wherein the contract was made. But whether or
not an arbitration agreement is to be enforced is a question of the
law of procedure and is determined by the law of the jurisdiction
wherein the remedy is sought.
That the enforcement of arbitration contracts is within the law
of procedure as distinguished from substantive law is well settled by
the decisions of our courts.
Neither is it true that such a statute, when it declares arbitration agreements to be valid, declares their existence as a matter of
substantive law. The courts have always recognized that such agreements have existed but have refused to enforce them. It was often
said loosely that arbitration agreements were void, even under the
common-law rule. This statement was not accurate. While the
courts refused to enforce arbitration agreements specifically, they
recognized their existence because they gave another remedy.
From the earliest times it was held that for a breach of arbitration
agreement the aggrieved party was entitled to damages.
In no proper sense, therefore, was the arbitration agreement
void. It was valid in the same sense that most contracts are valid[,]

227
228

See supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 112-13.
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i.e., while specific performance would not be given, a remedy for a
2 29
breach existed in the right to recover damages.

As stated above, all of the references in these paragraphs refer back to
the preceding paragraph, which discusses the procedure for enforcing
arbitration agreements in federal court. Indeed, the discussion of the
constitutional authority for Congress to make arbitration agreements
enforceable in state court follows immediately after this section of the
brief. Recall that Cohen begins that discussion with the statement
that "[s] o far as the present law declares simply the policy of recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements in the Federal courts it does
230
not encroach upon the province of the individual States."
The final section of the Cohen Brief discusses public policy arguments in support of the Act. Interestingly, unlike the discussion above
of Congress's power to make the FAA applicable in state court, which
appears in all of Cohen's subsequent publications, this policy section
does not appear in Cohen's later publications. Macneil quotes the
Cohen Brief:
[n]or can it be said that the Congress of the United States[,]
directing its own courts no longer to recognize this anachronism in
the law, would infringe upon the provinces or prerogatives of the
States. As we have already shown and as the Berkovitz case, supra,
declares again, the question of the enforcement relates to the law of
remedies and not to substantive law. The rule must be changed for
the jurisdiction in which the agreement is sought to be enforced,
and a change in the jurisdiction in which it was made is of no effect.
Every one of the States in the Union might declare such agreement
to be valid and enforceable, and still in the Federal courts it would
remain void and unenforceable unless the Supreme Court of the
United States felt at liberty itself to reverse a rul[e] recognized for
centuries. This, in the absence of a congressional declaration, it has
23 1
so far felt itself unable to do.
The Cohen Brief also states that
[t]here is no disposition therefore by means of the Federal
bludgeon to force an individual State into an unwilling submission
to arbitration enforcement. The statute can not have that effect. It
is desired only that the Federal Government shall declare the validity of arbitration agreements in the field where necessarily it is supreme and where without this action no remedial action by the
States ever can be effected. It is peculiarly within the province of
229
230
231
Arbib

Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 37-38 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39-40, quoted in MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 113 (referring to Berkovitz v.
& Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y. 261 (1921)).
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the Federal Government, we submit, to assure the citizens of different States that in dealing with each other they shall stand upon an
equal footing. If one of them is bound to arbitrate because he lives
in a State enforcing arbitration agreements, the other should
equally be bound and surely has no moral right to arbitrarily aban232
don all his obligations.
Macneil finds in this section "[f] urther indication that the statute
"....
233
to be limited to federal courts
intended
was
The only "field" where Congress was supreme and the State could
not provide for the effective enforceability of arbitration agreements was that of cases in federal courts. The States at that time had
unquestioned power to allow their own courts to enforce arbitration
agreements, whether such agreements involved interstate com234
merce or not.
Macneil cites the first sentence in the closing paragraph as "Cohen's
most colorful disclaimer of any intention to have the USAA govern in
235
state courts."
But Macneil reads too much into this section. He construes it as
stating that the FAA does not apply at all in state court, even to contracts involved in interstate commerce. But under such a reading, Cohen's statement that "the statute can not have that effect" contradicts
his earlier conclusion that Congress can, i.e., has the power to, make
the FAA applicable in state court. Instead, the paragraph is asserting,
quite correctly, that Congress can only act using its limited powers and
cannot force an "individual State" ("by means of the federal bludgeon") to make all arbitration agreements enforceable. Nevertheless,
when interstate commerce is involved (affecting more than one individual state) federal law is necessary to provide effective relief,
mostly-but not exclusively-by making arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court. Certainly, the excerpt highlights the enforceability of arbitration agreements in federal court (as does the rest
of the legislative history), but that is to be expected given that it was
the "primary purpose" of the FAA. But making arbitration agreements in interstate commerce enforceable in state court also is a field
in which the federal government is supreme and in which-as Cohen
already had concluded-Congress has the power to legislate. Thus,
the conjunction "and" on which Macneil places so much weight does
not exclude action in state court, even though states in some cases
232
233

Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 40.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 113.

234 Id. (footnote omitted).
235 Id. at 114.
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might effect a remedy. Instead, the (admittedly ambiguous) passage
reasonably could be read as referring to arbitration agreements in interstate commerce, which includes both those in federal court and
those in state court.
In sum, while it certainly is plausible to construe the Cohen Brief
as Professor Macneil has done, construing it as acknowledging that
the FAA applies in state court is more faithful to the document and
results in fewer ambiguities than Macneil's interpretation.
2.

Hearings

Congress held two hearings on the proposed FAA, one in 1923
and one in 1924. The 1924 Hearings are noteworthy because of the
Cohen Brief,236 which is attached to the hearing transcript. The testi-

mony at both hearings is consistent with the FAA being applicable in
state court.
1923 Hearings.
A Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held the first
hearings on the proposed FAA on January 31, 1923.237 Although Macneil describes the hearings at length, 23 8 he does not rely on any of the
239
testimony in support of his interpretation of the statute.
The testimony most relevant to the applicability of the FAA in
state court was that of Charles N. Bernheimer, the chair of the arbitration committee of the New York Chamber of Commerce. After outlining his experience with commercial arbitration, Bernheimer
described the proposed Act:
[t] his bill follows the lines of the New York arbitration law, applying it to the fields wherein there is Federal jurisdiction. These
fields are in admiralty and in foreign and interstate commerce. The
Federal courts, even in the district of New York, have refused to
apply the New York State law in admiralty cases. The fundamental
conception underlying the law is to make arbitration agreements
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. The commercial bodies of the
country have been urging the adoption of this principle of legislation throughout the country, and their point of view has now been
accepted by the American Bar Association .... 240
236
237

See supra Part Ill.C.1.
1923 Hearings, supra note 73.
238 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 88-91.
239 Id. at 111-13.
240 1923 Hearings, supra note 73, at 2.
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In response to questions, Bernheimer explained further the need
for the Act:
[f]rom the merchant's standpoint, I can say this, that arbitration clauses in contracts are used, but they are used with undue
caution and a great degree of uncertainty because of the revocability of the arbitration agreements after trouble has arisen and after
arbitration has commenced. That is so in every State excepting the
State of New York, and, I believe, the State of Illinois .

. .

. The

arbitration clause, Federally speaking, and in other States, is not enforceable. A merchant can not depend on it ....
Where they are involved as to New York State jurisdiction pure
and simple, we press for arbitration, and we can get it because there
is no difficulty about it; but the moment the Hudson River separates
us, over in New Jersey, and when it is a Jersey case against a New
241
York case, we can not do so.
Certainly this discussion illustrates the need for the FAA as applied to
interstate transactions, but it does not address whether the Act applies
in state court or only in federal court.

1924 Hearings.
I already have described the Cohen Brief,2 4 2 the most important
2 43
part of the January 9, 1924 Joint Hearings on the proposed FAA.
241 Id. at 3-4.
242 See supra Part III.C.I.
243 1924 Hearings, supra note 198. David Schwartz relies on a Senate Judiciary
Committee amendment to section 2 of the FAA as support for limiting the Act to

federal court. Schwartz, supra note 144 (manuscript at 11, on file with author). As
originally drafted, the FAA applied to "any contract or maritime transaction or transaction involving commerce." H.R. 646, 68th Cong. (1924), reprinted in 65 CONG. REC.
11,081 (1924). As amended, the Act applied to "any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce." S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2 (1924).
Schwartz argues that the original language indicates the FAA was intended to apply
only in federal court (Congress clearly had no authority to regulate all contracts in
state court), and that the amendment was intended to "shrink" the coverage of the
Act, not extend its application to state court. Schwartz, supra note 144 (manuscript at
11, on file with author). While original (Macneil does not discuss the amendment, see
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 100), Schwartz's argument is unpersuasive. All indications
from the legislative history are that the amendment was intended to make no substantive change in the statute-in other words, that the original language was not intended to have a broader reach than the language that ultimately became law. Thus,
the Cohen Brief-based on the original rather than the amended language-describes the Act as applicable to "a provision for arbitration contained in any contract
which involved maritime transactions (matters which would be embraced within admiralty jurisdiction) and interstate commerce as generally defined." Cohen Brief,
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The following summarizes that testimony at the 1924 Hearings that
Macneil finds to be on point.
In his description of the hearing, Macneil quotes from the testimony of Charles Bernheimer as to the need for an arbitration statute
addressing interstate transactions. Bernheimer testified in support of
formal arbitration, which is the basis on which this bill is framed,
namely, arbitration which has legal sanction, whereby arbitration
once agreed upon must be seen through, so that the parties can
not, as they can in the most of our States and certainly in connection with interstate business, back out at the last moment when they
see the case is going against them .... 244
The Chair of the Committee asked Bernheimer, "What you have
in mind is that this proposed legislation relates to contracts arising in
interstate commerce," to which Bernheimer answered, "Yes; entirely.
The farmer who will sell his carload of potatoes, from Wyoming, to a
dealer in the State of New Jersey, for instance." 245 As with his testi-

mony at the 1923 Hearings, while Bernheimer clearly identified the
need for a statute applicable to interstate transactions, including those
in federal court, his testimony sheds no light on whether the Act applied to such transactions in state court.
Macneil puts more emphasis on the testimony of Alexander Rose
of the Arbitration Society of America. Rose testified,
There is one excellent result to be achieved in the enactment of this
bill, apart from the enactment itself; it will set a standard throughout the United States. There are many States which have no arbitration law ....

[T] he enactment of this law, extending its effect all

over the United States, will have an effect upon the cause of that
much-desired thing-uniform legislation on a subject of this character. I have no doubt all of the States would pattern after it .... 246
Macneil's response is that "Rose saw two effects of the [FAA], legal
and moral." 24 7 The legal effect was the enactment of the FAA itself.

The moral effect was the encouragement that enactment would give
states to enact their own arbitration laws. Macneil concludes, "It may
be noted that the moral effect on state law he describes would have
been moot if the [FAA] superseded state law in state courts under the
supra note 198, at 34. Moreover, in commenting on the amendment later on the
Senate Floor, Senator Sterling explained that "[i]t is a little different phraseology, but
the purport is just the same as the language in the original bill." 66 CONG. REc. 2761

(1925).
244
245
246
247

1924 Hearings, supra note 198, at 7 (testimony of Charles L. Bernheimer).
Id.
Id. at 28 (testimony of Alexander Rose).
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 112.
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Supremacy Clause." 248 Macneil here ignores the limited scope of the

FAA in state court, resulting from the narrow interpretation at the
time of the Commerce Clause. The "moral effect" of the FAA-of
encouraging states to enact their own arbitration laws-most certainly
would not have been moot if the FAA applied in state courts. Many if
not most transactions in state court would not, under the prevailing
view, have been subject to the FAA. State arbitration laws were still
needed.
Finally, Macneil quotes at length from the testimony of Julius
Henry Cohen. 249 Cohen's brief to the Committee is discussed at
length above. 250 Macneil cites one passage from Cohen's testimony
25 1
that "particularly stands out":

[b]ut it can not be done under our constitutional form of government and cover the great fields of commerce until you gentlemen
do it, in the exercise of your power to confer jurisdiction on the
Federal courts. The theory on which you do this is that you have
the right to tell the Federal courts how to proceed .... 25"
As discussed above, because of uncertainty about the constitutionality
of the FAA even in federal court, its drafters relied both on the commerce power and on Congress's power to regulate the federal
courts. 253 The latter power plainly is what Cohen is addressing here.
But when, in his brief, Cohen discussed Congress's power to make
arbitration agreements enforceable in state court, he relied solely on
the commerce power. Nothing in this excerpt suggests that Cohen in
any way is repudiating that position. Instead, he simply is trying to
bolster what he sees as the primary (albeit not exclusive) purpose of
the legislation to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal

court.
In other passages, Cohen also addresses the need for federal
legislation:
[w]hat does this bill do? It destroys the anachronism in the
law. The very first sentence says if a man signs a contract for arbitration, it shall be irrevocable ....Why do we do that in the Federal
courts? We have it in New York State; the chamber of commerce
and the other commercial bodies got together and got it through in
New York. You have got it in New Jersey. The New Jersey Bar Association and the business men there got together and had it passed
248
249
250
251
252
253

Id.

Id. at 94-95.
See supra Part III.C.1.
supra note 15, at 112.
1924 Hearings, supra note 198, at 17 (testimony of Julius Henry Cohen).
See supra text accompanying notes 224-27.
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last year. Why do you have to have it in Federal law? There are
several reasons.
First of all, it was held that a State statute was not binding in
admiralty, even in the Federal courts .... And the Federal court will
not be bound by any State statute. This is in three segments: The
first is to get a State statute, and then to get a Federal law to cover
interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty, and, third, to get a
treaty with foreign countries ....
But the great field of business-why are these merchants and
these fruit shippers and those who are represented here, why are
they for this? Because of interstate business. And you know that
commerce is mostly interstate now. So that this is a great tonic that
is needed to strengthen this patient in the field of commercial activity, because when business men know that they do not have to get a
lawyer in California to enforce a case that does not involve more
business. That
than four or five hundred dollars they will do more
254
is why the business men are behind this thing.
Again, while these passages emphasize the importance of the proposed Act for interstate business and highlight the need for the FAA
in federal court, nothing excludes the application of the Act in state
court as well. Cohen's testimony (unlike the Cohen Brief) simply
does not address that issue.
3.

Reports

Following the hearings, both the House and Senate issued reports on the proposed FAA. Neither report is decisive as to whether
the Act applies in state court, although both are consistent with the
reading suggested here.
House Report.
The first report on the proposed Federal Arbitration Act was
House Report 96, issued on January 24, 1924. This report was the
principal source for Chief Justice Burger's legislative history analysis
255
in Southland.
The first sentence of the House Report, on which Chief Justice
Burger relied in his majority opinion in Southland, states,
The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving interstate
254
255
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commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or which
may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts. 2 56
As discussed above, the Southland majority found in the final "or" in
this sentence evidence that the FAA applied in state court: the FAA
makes arbitration agreements enforceable in contracts in interstate
commerce or in cases in federal court.
Macneil contends that the final "or" was "quite plainly and simply
a clerical or typographical mistake. The intention of the writers of the
Report was one of addition, not of alternative."' 25 7 Second, Macneil
(correctly) points out that Chief Justice Burger's reading proves too
much: Burger does not assert that the FAA applies to all federal court
cases, although that literally is what his interpretation suggests. Third,
Macneil falls back on the argument that the majority's reading "is at
odds with all the rest of the legislative history .... ,,258
Macneil too readily dismisses the sentence as containing a typographical error. Obviously, the previous "or" in the sentence is a typo
and should be "of." But that does not mean that there is second typo
in the excerpt. 259 Indeed, in a 1926 publication the American Arbitration Association used almost identical language in describing the
scope of the FAA, without the typo but containing the same key
phrase: "The United States Arbitration Act, effective January 1, 1926,
established a national policy and procedure for the settlement by arbitration of controversies arising out of inter-state commerce or maritime transactions, or within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. '2 60
But I agree that Chief Justice Burger placed too much weight on this
language in Southland. In my view, the most likely interpretation of
this language is that it was an attempt by the drafter of the House
256
257

H.R.

REP.

MACNEIL,

No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
supra note 15, at 118.

258

Id. at 119.

259

"Enforcible" is not a typographical error. Although the modern spelling is "en-

forceable," the spelling in the House Report was an acceptable one at the time. E.g.,
245 (2d ed. 1989).
260 MODEL ARBITRATION ACT (Am. Arbitration Ass'n 1926), in Model Arbitration
Statute Offered, 10J. AM.JUDICATURE Soc'Y 122, 124, 126 (1927). A later publication by
5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

the American Arbitration Association describes the FAA as applicable only to diversity
cases involving interstate commerce and maritime transactions: "[i]n 1925, Congress
enacted the United States Arbitration Act which became effective January 1, 1926.
Under this Act the foregoing principles are applicable to disputes arising out of inter-

state commerce and foreign transactions which involve $3,000 or more, and to maritime transactions."

AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES iii,
9 (1928) (acknowledging Wesley

A. Sturges, Kenneth Dayton, and Moses H. Grossman "for critical and constructive
suggestions upon the legal phases of the suggestions").
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Report to reflect that the Act's application in federal court was based
on two sources of constitutional authority, the Commerce Clause and
Congress's power to regulate the federal courts. So viewed, it does not
demonstrate that Congress intended the Act to apply in state court.
At the same time, however, it does not support Macneil's argument
that the intent of the language was "addition, not alternative." The
language certainly is at least consistent with the argument that the
FAA applies in state court.
The rest of the House Report is consistent with that argument as
well. After describing the origins of the Act, the Report continues,
The matter is properly the subject of Federal action. Whether
an agreement for arbitration shall be enforced or not is a question
of procedure to be determined by the law court in which the proceeding is brought and not one of substantive law to be determined
by the law of the forum in which the contract is made. Before such
contracts could be enforced in the Federal courts, therefore, this
law is essential. The bill declares that such agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the courts of the United States. The remedy is founded also upon the Federal control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty. The control over interstate commerce reaches not only the actual physical interstate shipment of
26 1
goods but also contracts relating to interstate commerce.
Plainly, the FAA makes arbitration agreements enforceable in federal
court, as the excerpt states. Because that is the "primary purpose" of
the Act (to use the words of the Cohen Brief), one would expect that
to be the House Report's focus. The excerpt also makes clear the
dual sources of constitutional authority on which Congress was relying. But nothing in the excerpt indicates that the Act applies only in
262
federal court.
The House Report then goes on to explain that "[t]he bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced,
and provides a procedure in the Federal c'ourts for their enforcement."2 63 This language is consistent with the FAA making all arbitration agreements in interstate commerce enforceable (in both state
and federal court), while also establishing a procedure for enforcement in federal court alone. The Report concludes: "[i] n view of the
strong support of commercial and legal bodies, the entire lack of opposition before the committee, the obvious justice of the result sought
261 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924).
262 Macneil himself states only that "[t]his statement is entirely consistent with
everything that had gone before limiting the proposed law to the federal courts."
MACNEIL,
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to be attained, and the evident propriety and necessity of Federal ac'2 64
tion, we submit that the bill should become law."

Senate Report.
Senate Report 536 was published on May 14, 1924.265 Macneil
concludes that the Report does not "throw any light on whether Congress intended state courts to be bound by the statute." 266 In fact, a
few snippets in the Report, while generally following the language of
section 2, at the very least are consistent with the argument here.
First, the Report describes the bill as one "to make valid and enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes
arising out of contracts, maritime transactions, or commerce among
the States or Territories or with foreign nations

....

-267 Second, the

Report states,
It is not contended that agreements to arbitrate have no validity
whatever. A party may be liable in an action for damages for the
breach of an executory agreement to arbitrate; or, if the agreement
has been executed according to its terms and an award made, the
appropriate action may be brought at law or in equity to enforce the
award. Both maritime contracts or transactions and contracts in268
volving interstate commerce are at least valid to this extent.

Finally, the Report describes the proposed Act as follows: "[t]he bill,
while relating to maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate
and foreign commerce, follows the lines of the New York arbitration
law . . ."269 In each case, the reach of the Act is described generally,
as applicable to contracts in interstate commerce, and not as limited
to proceedings in federal court. I do not claim that such statements
are by any means decisive. But they are consistent with the FAA being
applicable in state court.
4.

Floor Debates

The floor debates on the FAA are "exceptionally meagre," as acknowledged even by contemporary commentators. 270 As such, it is
not surprising that there is little of interest. Macneil states, "In the
discussions, such as they were, on the House and Senate floors, what
264

Id.

265 S. REP. No. 68-536 (1924).
MNACNEIL, supra note 15, at 100.
267 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 1.
268 Id. at 2.
269 Id. at 3.
270 Baum & Pressman, supra note 192, at 429.
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was said casts virtually no additional light on the question of applica27 1
bility in state courts."
The only reference even possibly relevant to the FAA's applicability in state court is the following, which also is the only reference
quoted by Macneil. 272 On February 5, 1924, the House briefly considered the proposed FAA.2 73 Representative Graham of Pennsylvania
described the Act:
[t]his bill simply provides for one thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in commercial contracts and admiralty contracts-an agreement to arbitrate, when voluntarily
placed in the document by the parties to it. It does not involve any
new principle of law except to provide a simple method by which
the parties may be brought before the court in order to give enforcement to that which they have already agreed to. It does not
affect any contract that has not the agreement in it to arbitrate, and
only gives the opportunity after personal service of asking the parties to come in and carry through, in good faith, what they have
agreed to do. It does nothing more than that. It creates no new

legislation, grants no new rights, except a remedy to enforce an
agreement in commercial contracts and in admiralty contracts. 2 7 4
Macneil argues that the lack of debate and the dismissive statement by
Representative Graham "strongly impl [y] that the bill was well understood to do nothing of a revolutionary nature, such as regulating remedies and detailed procedures in state courts. '' 275 I addressed these
arguments above, explaining that the FAA did not set out "detailed
procedures in state courts" (only section 2 of the FAA applies in state
court), and that the lack of opposition to the FAA in Congress likely
was due to the narrow reach of the commerce power at the time. 276
Overall, the congressional materials-with the Cohen Brief as the
centerpiece-provide strong indications that Congress intended the
FAA to apply in state court. Although there are ambiguities, the ambiguities are fewer than those under Professor Macneil's interpretation
of the FAA as applicable only in federal court.

D. Post-Enactment Commentary by Supporters of the FAA
Following enactment of the FAA, several of its prominent supporters wrote commentaries describing the Act. After reviewing these
271
272

supra note 15, at 120.
Id. at 98-99.
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65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924) (statement of Rep. Graham).
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 120.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-62, 174-90.
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commentaries (and others) in detail, Macneil concludes that "the
early commentators, including those who had been intimately involved in promoting its enactment, never questioned that the basic
provisions of the act governed only in the federal courts." 277 I disagree. The commentaries by the FAA's supporters either assert that
the FAA applies in state court (by including parts of the Cohen
Brief) 278 or are fully consistent with that view.

1. ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law
The "most important and the earliest"279 of the commentaries on

the FAA was published in the ABA Journalby the ABA's Committee on
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, which had prepared and
promoted the original bill.23 0 Macneil calls the commentary "about as
28 1
official a commentary as one could find."

The article closely follows the Cohen Brief in the 1924 Hearings
on the Act, 28

2

including the key passages of the brief discussing the

constitutionality of federal legislation making arbitration agreements
enforceable in state court. In Macneil's words, that section was "lifted
almost verbatim from Julius Henry Cohen's brief submitted to the
joint subcommittee."' 28 3 For the reasons explained earlier, that section is best understood as indicating that while the "primary purpose"
of the FAA was for the Act to govern in federal court, a secondary
purpose was that it should govern in state courts as well. 284 Repeating

that section here, Cohen reiterates his view that the FAA applies in
state court.
Nothing in the rest of the article is to the contrary. For example,
in describing the central provisions of the Act, the article uses language similar, albeit not identical, to that in the Cohen Brief. If anything, the Committee's language is even more suggestive that the FAA
applies in state court:
[s]peaking in general terms, the act provides that written
clauses providing for arbitration of future disputes contained in any
277 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 127.
278 See supra Part I1I.C.I.
279 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 122.
280 Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 199. The
members of the committee, indicated as authors of the article, were W.H.H. Piatt,
Julius Henry Cohen, Province M. Pogue, Hollis R. Bailey, and Harvey F. Smith. Id. at
156.
281 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 122.
282 See supra Part III.C.1.
283
284

MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 122.
See supra text accompanying notes 196-230.
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contract relating to maritime transactions (i.e., matters which would
normally be embraced in admiralty jurisdiction) or involving interstate commerce shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable except
on the grounds for which any contract may be revoked. The same
rules apply to a submission to arbitration of a controversy already
285
existing.
The next paragraph then begins addressing sections 3 and 4 of the
Act:
[i] n addition to the declaration of the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements within these two fields, the Federal
courts are given jurisdiction to enforce agreements for arbitration
or submissions and a procedure is established by which such enforcement can be had summarily. The jurisdiction exists in those
cases in which, under the Judicial Code, the Federal courts would
normally have jurisdiction of the controversy between the
28 6
parties.
The text of the brief thus distinguishes between the two fields in
which the Act declares arbitration agreements valid and enforceable-admiralty and interstate commerce-and the procedure for enforcement established in sections 3 and 4, which is applicable only in
federal court.
. In the one section of the article that is not a reworking of the
Cohen Brief, the article concludes with a discussion of the proposed
Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA"). The Committee was critical of the
proposed UAA because, unlike the FAA, it did not make pre-dispute
arbitration agreements valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. The article argued that given the unanimous approval of the FAA in Congress,
the drafters of the UAA should "try to harmonize the state laws to
2 87
meet" the federal law.
The last paragraph of this section makes the argument in favor of
uniformity between federal law and state law as follows: "[f] or how can
the legislative situation be uniform in the States, if there is a different
policy in the case of contracts involving intrastate commerce from that
now made national in the case of contracts involving interstate commerce?" 288 As Macneil acknowledges, "So far the quotation appears to
suggest that the new [FAA] is indeed a regulatory statute governing
state courts. ' 289 The quote does not distinguish between the policy
285

Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 199, at 153-54.

286

Id. at 154.

287

Id. at 156.

288

Id.

289
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supra note 15, at 123.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 78:1

applicable in federal court and that in state court, which presumably it
would if the drafters believed the FAA applied only in federal court.
The article continues,
And why should merchants whose claims being under $3,000 must
apply to state courts for relief, meet a situation where, if the claim is
against a non-resident and involves interstate commerce, the contract for arbitration is valid; but, though it be $10,000, if it be
against a fellow resident or involve only intrastate commerce, it is
invalid and revocable? It is precisely such situations which require
290
uniformity.
From this sentence, Macneil concludes, "There could be no clearer
indication than this that the very committee which instigated the bill
and was entirely responsible for Congress's understanding of it, knew
29 1
that the USAA governed only in federal courts."
Macneil does not explain his understanding of this paragraph,
but presumably it goes as follows: if a "claim is against a non-resident
and involves interstate commerce, the contract for arbitration is valid"
because the case is in federal court and thus subject to the FAA. But
"if it be against a fellow resident"-a case with no diversity jurisdiction
and thus in state court-"or involve only intrastate commerce"-so
that even though the case is in federal court the FAA does not apply292
the arbitration agreement is "invalid and revocable."
There are, however, at least two other plausible interpretations of
this language, and all of the interpretations-including Macneil'sare unsatisfactory in some respect. Macneil's interpretation results in
at least two ambiguities (in addition to its acknowledged inconsistency
with the introductory sentence of the paragraph). First, Macneil ignores the initial clause, which refers to "merchants whose claims being
under $3,000 must apply to state courts for relief."293 Macneil's inter-

pretation disregards this language altogether, and instead construes

"the claim . . .against a non-resident" as meaning a case in federal

court, even though the claim seems to be one for less than $3000.294
Second, Macneil apparently considers the final case, which involves
"only intrastate commerce" likewise as referring to a case in federal
court. But enactment of a state arbitration act would not create "uni290
291
292
293

Comm. on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, supra note 199, at 156.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 123.
Id.
The amount in controversy at the time was $3000, so that even if the dispute

was between a resident and a non-resident, the case would be in state court. Id. at

105.
294

Id. at 123.
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formity" in such a case because at that time federal courts would not
295
apply state arbitration laws.

A second interpretation is that each of the claims referred to in
the paragraph is in state court, as suggested by the limitation to
merchants "whose claims being under $3,000 must apply to state
courts for relief." Under this interpretation, the first sentence of the
paragraph-citing the need for uniformity between contracts in interstate commerce and contracts in intrastate commerce-makes sense.
The FAA would apply to contracts'in interstate commerce, even in
state court, and so the arbitration agreement involved with the first
claim would be valid. But intrastate claims would not be subject to the
FAA-in state court as well as federal court-and so the arbitration
clause would be invalid with respect to the latter two claims. This interpretation, however, does not make sense of the assumed $10,000
amount in controversy for those claims, which would have been
enough to permit a claim against a non-resident to be filed in federal
court. It also renders superfluous the phrases that refer to the residence of the party, since residence is relevant to determining whether
there is diversity jurisdiction.
A third possible interpretation likewise is consistent with the FAA
making arbitration agreements enforceable in state court. Under this
interpretation, the first claim is, as the initial clause suggests, in state
court because it fails to meet the jurisdictional amount even though it
is against a non-resident. The arbitration clause is valid because the
claim involves interstate commerce and thus is subject to the FAA. Of
the latter two claims, the first is in state court (because it involves a
fellow resident) and the second is in federal court (because by implication it is against a non-resident and the jurisdictional amount is
met). However, in neither case does the FAA apply, because the claim
in state court is against a fellow resident (and thus does not involve
interstate commerce) and the claim in federal court, even though
against a non-resident, also does not involve interstate commerce.
This interpretation suffers from one of the same weaknesses as Macneil's view-a state uniform arbitration act.would not have created
uniformity in federal court. It also requires an assumption that the
Committee intended all cases involving claims against fellow residents
not to involve interstate commerce, which may be too much of a
stretch.
As I acknowledged earlier, the legislative history does contain ambiguities, and under each of these interpretations the above paragraph is ambiguous. Under at least two plausible interpretations,
295

See supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
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however, the paragraph can be understood as consistent with the view
that the FAA applies in state court.
2.

Bernheimer

Macneil next considers an article by Charles L. Bernheimer, chair
of the Committee on Arbitration of the New York State Chamber of
Commerce, 296 "extolling the new act."297 Much of the article comes

from Bernheimer's testimony at the 1923 Hearings on the proposed
Act. 298 Two passages from the article are of interest. First, Bern-

heimer describes the scope of the FAA as follows:
[t]he bill, conceived in the hope of simplifying business procedure in the matters of dispute or difference which daily arise, and
will continue to arise just so long as there is trade among men, follows the lines of the New York State Arbitration Law, applying it to
the fields wherein there is federal jurisdiction. These fields are in
299
admiralty and in foreign and interstate commerce.

Macneil comments that "Bernheimer, a non-lawyer, had trouble, as in
fact did some of the lawyers, with that difficult word 'jurisdiction.'-"300
Recognizing that Bernheimer's description of the FAA's scope is
broad enough to include disputes in state court that involve interstate
commerce, Macneil then quotes a later excerpt from the article:
the federal courts are given jurisdic[u] nder this new law ....
tion to enforce agreements for arbitration or submissions, and a
procedure is established by which enforcement can speedily be secured. Jurisdiction exists in those cases in which the federal courts
would normally, under the Judicial Code, have jurisdiction of a con30
troversy between the parties. '
Macneil argues that because of Bernheimer's later use of the word
'jurisdiction" to refer to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, "any
possible implication that these jurisdictional fields extend beyond the
3' 0 2
federal courts disappears.
While I do not place too much weight on Bernheimer's general
description of the FAA's scope, it is nonetheless consistent with the
view that the Act applies in state court as well as federal court. The
supporters of the Act consistently described the scope of the FAA, as
296

297
298
299
300
301
302

Charles L. Bernheimer, The United States Arbitration Act, 3
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 123.
See supra text accompanying notes 240-41.
Bernheimer, supra note 296, at 2928.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 123.
Bernheimer, supra note 296, at 2929.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 123.
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does Bernheimer, as applicable to disputes involving admiralty and
interstate commerce, without limiting that scope to the federal courts.
Only when describing the procedures implemented by sections 3 and
4 do the supporters mention federal courts.
Moreover, Bernheimer's use of the word 'Jurisdiction" in two different contexts does not evidence any sort of "trouble." One meaning
of 'jurisdiction" refers to the court's power to adjudicate. That is the
30 3
meaning Bernheimer used in the second excerpt quoted above.
But another meaning of 'Jurisdiction" refers to the legislature's authority to enact legislation, as in "prescriptive" or "legislative" jurisdiction. 30 4 It plainly is in that sense, which is distinct from the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, that Bernheimer uses the word 'ju30 5
risdiction" in the first excerpt quoted above.
In short, if anything the Bernheimer article supports the argument that the drafters of the FAA intended that it apply in state court.
It certainly is not inconsistent with that view.
3.

Bailey Comments

Macneil next cites a statement by Hollis R. Bailey, one of the
members of the ABA Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law30 6 and whom Macneil describes as a "staunch reform sup-

porter," 30 7 at the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1925. Arguing for the Commissioners to harmonize the
Uniform Arbitration Act with the FAA, Bailey asserted,
You are going to ask the American Bar Association, having committed itself to [the New Jersey] form of an arbitration act, which has
been, furthermore, adopted by the United States Congress since the
12th of February, 1925, and has been the law of the United States
governing the federal courts, you are going to ask the American Bar
303

See supra text accompanying note 301.

304 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(a) (1987)
(discussing 'Jurisdiction to prescribe"); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International
Law, in 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1972-1973, at 145, 179-212 (Humphrey Waldock et al.
eds., 1975) (discussing "legislative jurisdiction"); Willis L.M. Reese, LegislativeJurisdiction, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1587 (1978). As the Restatement makes clear, "The domestic
law of the United States addresses the propriety of exercises ofjurisdiction by legislative, executive, administrative, or judicial bodies, both federal and State, under the
United States Constitution, the State constitutions, and State and federal law." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 401 cmt. b.
305
306

See supra text accompanying note 299.
See supra note 280.
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Association to approve a state law entirely different, radically differ30 8
ent, from what it has approved for the federal law of the land.
Macneil contends that here Bailey "revealed his unquestioned understanding that the [FAA] governed only in federal court. ' 30 9 Rather,
what Bailey revealed was his understanding that the FAA governed in
310
federal court, not that it governed only in federal court.
4.

Cohen and Dayton

Finally, Professor Macneil points to an additional article by Julius
Henry Cohen (co-authored with Kenneth Dayton) in the Virginia Law
Review.3 1' Macneil describes the article as "reflecting [Cohen's] clear
understanding that the [FAA] did not govern state courts."3 12 Much
of the article, as Macneil points out, 3 13 is virtually identical to the Cohen Brief in the 1924 Hearings.3 14 Indeed, the article repeats yet again
Cohen's conclusion that Congress had the power to make the FAA
applicable in state court and asserts that the "primary purpose" of the
Act was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in federal
court, 3 15 implying that a constitutionally permissible, albeit secondary,
purpose was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state
court.
The article also reiterates the summary of the statute in the Cohen Brief, revised to reflect changes in the Act as enacted by Congress. The following is the key paragraph:
[t]he Federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce such
agreements whenever under the Judicial Code they would have had
jurisdiction of an action or proceeding arising out of the contro308 NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROC. OF THE
Ti-IIRr-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 65 (1925) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].

309

MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 123.
310 Macneil points out that one of the other delegates, Jesse A. Miller of Iowa,
construed the FAA as applicable only in federal court. See id. at 124. Miller explained
that the ABA "didn't pass on this act or any act that is applicable to the states. All it
had before it was an act which applied to a few limited subjects where the federal
courts would have control .... " HANDBOOK, supra note 308, at 71-72. The contrast
between Miller's statement and Bailey's statement highlights the lack of exclusivity in
Bailey's assertion. Even though, as Macneil concludes, no other delegate "disputed"
Miller's assertion about the FAA, MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 124, that hardly indicates
agreement. Moreover, emphasizing that the FAA applied in state court would not

likely help the cause of those who supported revisions to the Uniform Arbitration Act.
311 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 200.
312 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 124.
313 Id.
314 See supra Part III.C.1.
315 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 200, at 277-78.
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versy between the parties. Where the basis ofjurisdiction is diversity
of citizenship, the dispute must involve $3000 as in suits at law.* In
or other property at the
admiralty the party still may libel a vessel
3 16
commencement of his proceeding.
The asterisk indicates the following footnote:
* [t]he statute as drafted and as it passed the House omitted
this requirement. It should not have been re-inserted. The reason
for the requirement is to relieve the Federal courts of a mass of
petty litigation. But since these arbitration proceedings involve only
motion practice, and occasionally summary trials on limited issues,
there was no threat of overburdening the courts. On the other
and lacking
hand, most arbitration disputes involve small amounts,
317
state statutes, the Federal law ought to cover them.
The change reflects Congress's deletion of proposed section 8 of the
FAA, which would have done away with the amount in controversy
requirement in cases involving diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. 318
According to Macneil, the last sentence of the footnote shows Cohen's view that the FAA did not apply in state court. Macneil states,
"If, as the Supreme Court later held in Southland Corp. v. Keating
(U.S. 1984), the [FAA] governed in state courts, then, of course, the
federal law did cover these small claims." 31 9 I disagree. The footnote
refers to the discussion of the procedure provided in section 4 of the
Act for actions to compel arbitration in federal court. Cohen and
Dayton were lamenting the fact that the federal procedures available
in sections 3 and 4 did not cover diversity cases that did not satisfy the
amount in controversy requirement. The issue was not the irrevocability and enforceability of the arbitration agreements, but the procedure. "[T] he Federal law [that] ought to cover them" was sections 3
and 4 of the FAA, not section 2.320
In sum, contrary to Macneil's argument, the contemporaneous
writings by the supporters of the FAA 32 1 all are consistent with the
316 Id. at 267.
317 Id. at 267 n.*.
318 See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 124. Thus, the original Cohen Brief stated:
"[a]lthough, if the basis of jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, the usual limitation
of $3,000 is removed." Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 34.
319 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 124. Macneil makes a similar argument about Congress's deletion of section 8 itself. Id. at 105.
320 See supra text accompanying note 317. Macneil's argument makes sense given
his view that the FAA was an integrated statute which either applies in its entirety or
not at all. This excerpt is further indication that the drafters of the FAA did not see it
that way.
321 Macneil also notes an amicus brief prepared by Cohen and Dayton on behalf
of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York and the American Arbitration
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interpretation offered here-that those supporters believed that the
Act applied in state court as well as in federal court.
E. Other Contemporaneous Commentary
Other contemporaneous legal commentary also provides an indication of how the FAA was understood at the time. For obvious reasons, this commentary is less helpful than commentary written by
those directly involved in the legislative process. Nonetheless, it still
may be useful, at least if it was unanimous. It was not.
As Macneil points out,3 2 2 most contemporaneous commentaryother than that written by supporters of the FAA-either concluded
that the FAA did not apply in state court or simply did not consider
the issue.3 23 Indeed, Macneil states that "[i] n the years following enactment of the [FAA], I have come across only one work, a 1929 student note, which even considered the possibility that it might govern
in state courts. The note promptly rejected the idea .... -324 As a
result, Macneil concludes, 'Just as one would have predicted from any
careful analysis of the legislative history of the [FAA], the early commentators . . .never questioned that the basic provisions of the act

governed only in the federal courts." 325
Contrary to Professor Macneil's contention, however, at least one
contemporaneous commentator (in addition to the supporters of the
Act discussed above 3 26) not only considered the possibility that the
FAA applied in state courts, but in fact concluded that the FAA did
apply in state court. Alfred N. Heuston, a Special Assistant to the
United States Attorney General from 1924-1926 who later became a
partner in the law firm of White & Case in New York,3 27 wrote an
article for the Washington Law Review arguing that the state of WashAssociation in Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1932). MACNEIL, supra
note 15, at 127. I discuss this brief, as does Macneil, id. at 132-33, in connection with

the early court cases considering the FAA. See infra text accompanying notes 342-51.
322 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 122-27.
323 See WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDS
§ 480, at 937 (1930); 6 SAMUEL WILLISTON & GEORGEJ. THOMPSON, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1920, at 5368 (rev. ed. 1938); Baum & Pressman, supra note 192,
at 459. Macneil describes the relevant portions of these sources in detail in his book; I
do not repeat the description here. MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 125-27.
324 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 124; see id. at 226 n.23 (citing Note, Problems in
Statutory Construction Arising Out of Arbitration Laws, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 195, 196-97

(1929)).
325
326
327

See id. at 127.
See supra Part 111D.
1 WHO'S WHO IN LAW 429 U.C. Schwartz ed., 1937); N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1955,

at 29 (obituary). Although Heuston was in Washington when the FAA was enacted, I
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ington should adopt a revised arbitration act.3 28 Most of Heuston's

article, which was published in 1926, addressed Washington state arbitration law. In one section, however, the article addresses the newly
enacted Federal Arbitration Act. That section draws heavily from the
ABA commentary and confirms in straightforward terms what I argue
in this article: the FAA's supporters believed and informed Congress
that the Act applies in state court.
Heuston first considered the provisions of the Act. As with the
various legislative reports and other commentaries, he described sections 1 and 2 in general terms and with no limitation to federal
courts. 329 He then described the subsequent sections of the FAA, not-

ing their applicability in federal court. He commented that "[o]f
course, the act has not yet been the subject of judicial interpretation.
It was carefully drawn, however, and as it is very similar to the New
York act which has been approved by the United States Supreme
Court, it will probably stand the test of constitutionality. ' 33 0 Finally,
Heuston analyzed the applicability of the Act in state court:
[t]he act is broad enough to apply to actions commenced in
state courts as well as to those instituted in federal courts, and it was
so intended by those who drafted it. It was recognized, however,
that it might be held that Congress could not so regulate procedure
in the state courts even though maritime and interstate commerce
matters were involved. Consequently, the act was so drafted that
such a decision would not affect its application to the federal
courts.

33

'

Again, Heuston's article was published in 1926, making it one of the
earliest commentaries on the Act. It demonstrates that at least one
contemporary commentator understood the FAA exactly as inter-

preted by the Court in Southland.
can find no indication whether he had any involvement with the Act, in an official or
unofficial capacity.

328 Heuston, supra note 29. Heuston was born in the state of Washington, and
had practiced in that state before moving to Washington, D.C. 1 WHo's WHO IN LAW,
supra note 327, at 429.
329 Heuston, supra note 29, at 257. Heuston wrote,
The United States Arbitration Act, approved by the President February 12,
1925, went into effect on January 1st of this year. It applies only to maritime
contracts and to contracts involving interstate or foreign commerce. Agree-

ments to arbitrate disputes, existing and future, arising out of such contracts
are declared to be "valid, irrevocable and enforceable."
Id. (footnote omitted).
330 Id. at 257-58 (footnote omitted).
331 Id. at 258 (footnotes omitted).
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I certainly do not suggest that the fact that one 1926 law review
article interpreted the FAA as applicable in state court definitively resolves the question at hand. 332 Indeed, as far as the authoritativeness

of sources goes, the commentators cited by Macneil are among the
most prominent arbitration scholars of the time. Instead, the claim in
this Part is more modest: that interpreting the FAA as applicable in
state court was not beyond the realm of contemplation at the time of
its enactment, even among those not involved in the legislative
process.
F

Cases

Macneil's final argument is that the contemporary understanding
of the FAA-as not applicable in state court-is shown by the lack of
state court cases even considering the FAA for several decades after its
enactment. 3 3 He further cites the lack of any federal court discussion
of the issue during the same period.3 34 Justice Thomas made a similar
point in his dissenting opinion in Allied-Bruce: "to judge from the reported cases, it appears that no state court was even asked to enforce
the statute for many years after the passage of the FAA." 33 5 I know of
no earlier court cases than those cited by Macneil.33 6 But I disagree
with the conclusion he draws from the lack of cases.

332 For what it is worth, I discovered the Heuston article only after formulating the
thesis of this article: that the drafters of the FAA intended that it apply in state court.
The Heuston article was merely further support for that conclusion.
333 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 127-28. Macneil states,
The most striking thing of all is the absence of state cases concerning the
[FAA] from its enactment until 1959. Twenty years elapsed after the enactment before any reported state case can be found in which a state court
seems even to have thought of applying the [FAA] ....
[T] hirty-four years
after its enactment, the [FAA] had yielded a grand total of only five reported
cases in which efforts had been made to have it applied in state courts.
Id. (footnote omitted).
334 Id. at 131 (based on examination of forty cases listed in annotations to Title 9
of the 1942 U.S.C.A.).
335 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 288 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
336 I do have a small quibble as to the date of the earliest reported state court case
discussing the FAA: the trial court's opinion in French v. Petrinovic,46 N.Y.S.2d 846
(City Ct. 1944), was issued in 1944, a year earlier than the appellate court opinion in
the same case cited by Macneil. See MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 128 & n.40 (citing
French v. Petrinovic, 54 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Term 1945)).
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1. State Court Cases
Although Macneil's argument is intuitively appealing-surely if
Congress intended the FAA to apply in state court, some state court
would have considered that issue much earlier-in fact it is not unheard of for issues to lie dormant for decades before they make it to
court. One example is hotly litigated today: the effect of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act on binding pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in consumer warranties. Although the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act took effect in 1975,'3 7 the first published opinion considering the effect of the Act on pre-dispute arbitration agreements in
consumer warranties was not decided until 1997, over twenty years
3
later. 38
There is particular reason for such a time lag with respect to the
FAA: the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the commerce
power in 1925 meant that relatively few cases in state court were likely
even to present the issue. That the first reported state court case addressing the FAA was decided in 1944 does not seem so unusual given
that the key cases in the expansion of the commerce power were not
decided until the late 1930s and early 1940s.3 3 9 Moreover, one would
expect parties in states without arbitration laws to seek enforcement in
federal court if at all possible, given that the FAA clearly applied in
federal court. Conversely, in states with arbitration laws making arbitration agreements enforceable, such as New York, there would be little need for parties and courts to rely on the FAA at all.
Indeed, even today-with Southland decided and dozens of state
statutes being invalidated-there are still cases failing to consider the
applicability of the FAA. As Macneil and his co-authors state in their
treatise, "State courts often, and federal courts sometimes, seem hap337

15 U.S.C. § 2312 (2000).

338 See Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1530 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 127
F.3d 40 (11th Cir. 1997). Since then, the cases have become quite common, with the
state and federal courts split on the issue. Compare Davis v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 305
F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002) (Magnuson-Moss claims subject to arbitration); Walton v.

Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002) (same); S. Energy Homes, Inc.
v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000) (per curiam) (same); Howell v. Cappaert Manufactured Hous., 819 So. 2d 461 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (same); and In reAm. Homestar of
Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001) (same), with Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile
Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Va. 2000) (holding that Magnuson-Moss pre-

cludes arbitration of claims arising under written warranty); Borowiec v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 772 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (refusing to enforce arbitration clause
in written warranty due to Magnuson-Moss), and Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d 529,
532-35 (Miss. 2002) (Magnuson-Moss overrides the FAA and invalidates arbitration
clause in written warranty).
339 See supra text accompanying notes 174-92.
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pily unaware that the FAA governs the case before them and apply
state law."'3 40 Thus, the absence of state cases in the early years following enactment of the FAA does not (necessarily, at least) demonstrate
that the Act was intended to apply only in state court.
2.

Federal Court Cases

As for federal courts, it is not surprising that no federal courts
discussed the applicability of the FAA in state court. The FAA plainly
applied in federal court, and there would be little reason for a federal
court to consider whether the Act applied in state court. What I find
more interesting is that even in federal court, few reported cases dealt
with the FAA. Macneil states that "[t]he 1942 U.S.C.A. annotation
summarizes about forty Title 9 cases, all those the publishers deemed
important enough to mention in the first sixteen years of the active
life of the [FAA] .-341 With fewer than three reported cases per year in
federal court, where the FAA clearly is applicable, the lack of state
court cases involving the FAA seems far less unusual.
As Macneil notes, the "most important ' 342 federal court case during that period was Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus,"5 43 in which the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the FAA. Because the
case came to the Supreme Court from a lower federal court, again it is
not surprising that the Court did not discuss whether the Act applied
in state court.
340 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 9.5.4, at 9:48-:49.
341 MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 131 (footnote omitted).
342 Id.
343 284 U.S. 263 (1932). By comparison, David Schwartz relies on Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924), decided before enactment of the FAA. He argues that had Congress intended the FAA to apply in state court, the Act "would have
effectively overruled Red Cross Line," which had only a year earlier applied state arbitration law in state court to enforce an arbitration clause in a maritime contract.
Schwartz, supra note 144 (manuscript at 15, on file with author). But applying section
2 of the FAA in state court is fully consistent with the outcome in Red Cross Line, which
held the arbitration clause enforceable-the same result as under the FAA. Moreover, the key aspect of Red Cross Line for the FAA's supporters was that it upheld the
constitutionality of the New York arbitration law, a fact that was highlighted in the
Senate Report on the bill. S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924) ("The bill, while relating to
maritime transactions and to contracts in interstate and foreign commerce, follows
the lines of the New York arbitration law enacted in 1920, amended in 1921, and
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the matter of Red
Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., rendered February 18, 1924."). The lack of any other
discussion of Red Cross Line in the FAA's legislative history is not surprising given that
the case was decided after both hearings on the bill were completed.
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The case is of "special interest," according to Macneil, 34 4 because
Julius Henry Cohen (and Kenneth Dayton, Cohen's co-author of the
Virginia Law Review article) 345 filed an amicus brief on behalf of the
New York Chamber of Commerce and the American Arbitration Association. 34 6 In the brief, Cohen and Dayton argued that the FAA applies to all cases in federal court, even those not involving interstate
commerce or admiralty. They relied on the fact that the language
addressing interstate commerce and admiralty appears only in section
2 of the Act and not elsewhere. 3 47 The brief further argued that sections 1 and 2 create federal subject matter jurisdiction over all arbitration matters in interstate commerce,3

48

an argument that was rejected

(in dicta) by the Court in Southland349 and seems inconsistent with
350
Cohen and Dayton's position in their Virginia Law Review article.
Nothing in the amicus brief addresses the applicability of the FAA in
state court, but as Macneil recognizes, "Such an argument was unnecessary to win the case, and it would have been most unwise to advance
it."

35 1

In short, nothing in the federal court cases after enactment of the
FAA suggests that the Act did not apply in state court.
G.

Summary

Thus, Chief Justice Burger reached the right conclusion about
the FAA's legislative history in Southland, although his inadequate
opinion provided an all-too-easy target. This section briefly summarizes my analysis.
(1) The Cohen Brief-drafted by Julius Henry Cohen and submitted to Congress at the 1924 Hearings-arguesthat Congress had
the power under the Commerce Clause to make the FAA applicable in
state court. The context of the discussion makes clear that, contrary
to Professor Macneil's assertion, this is not merely a discussion of hypothetical congressional powers but an argument that the FAA is constitutional as applied in state court. Indeed, the discussion identifies
the "primary purpose" of the FAA as making agreements to arbitrate
344

345

supra note 15, at 132.
See supra text accompanying notes 311-21.

MACNEIL,

346 Brief for the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York and the American Arbitration Association, Inc., Amici Curiae, Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284

U.S. 263 (1932) (No. 172).
347 Id. at 21-23.
348 Id. at 24.
349

350
351

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 & n.9 (1984).
See supra text accompanying notes 311-21.
MACNEIL, supra note 15, at 228 n.63.
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enforceable in federal court, implying that a secondary purpose was to
make such agreements enforceable in state court. Thus, the Cohen
Brief provides strong evidence that the supporters of the FAA not only
believed that the FAA applied in state court, but also communicated
that belief to Congress.
(2) Cohen also asserted that the FAA applied in state court (using
words essentially identical to those in his brief to Congress) in two law
journal articles he co-authored after the enactment of the FAA. In
addition, despite Macneil's claim to the contrary, at least one other
contemporaneous commentator flatly stated that the FAA applied in
state court. Such statements belie the commonly asserted view that no
one in 1925 believed that the FAA applied in state court, either because arbitration matters were procedural or because it would have
been too great an infringement on state sovereignty.
(3) The vast majority of statements in the legislative history, relied on by Professor Macneil as well as Justices O'Connor and Thomas
to argue that FAA applies only in federal court, state merely that the
FAA applies in federal court, not that it applies only in federal
court. 352 Given that the "primary purpose" of the FAA was to make

arbitration agreements enforceable in federal court, that is to be expected. But such statements are not inconsistent with the applicability
of the Act in state court. Likewise, contemporaneous statements that
the FAA was based on Congress's power to establish rules of procedure in federal court do not demonstrate that the Act applied only in
federal court. Because of doubts about the constitutionality of the
FAA, its supporters relied on both Congress's power to regulate the
federal courts and its power to regulate interstate commerce. The applicability of the Act in state court obviously could be grounded (and
was in fact grounded) solely on the commerce power. Finally, statements in the legislative history to the effect that the FAA does not
infringe on the authority of the states to regulate arbitration agreements, again read in context, refer not to section 2 of the FAA but to
provisions of the Act establishing procedures for enforcing arbitration
agreements in federal court, i.e., sections 3 and 4 of the Act, which by
their terms apply only in federal court.
(4) In my view, the central historical reason for such "transformation" of the FAA as has occurred is not, as usually asserted, the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.353 Instead, the key change affecting

the FAA has been the post-New Deal expansion of Congress's commerce power, which has resulted in the FAA applying to a vastly wider
352
353

See supra Part III.C.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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array of cases today than it originally did, both in federal court and in
state court. The narrow reach of the FAA when enacted makes both
the lack of opposition to the Act in Congress and the limited number
of state cases considering the Act much less significant than Professor
Macneil argues.
At bottom, I do not claim that the legislative history of the FAA
unambiguously demonstrates that Congress intended the Act to apply
in state court. Instead, I agree with Chief Justice Burger (albeit for
different reasons) that, although the legislative history is "not without
ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in mind
something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable
only in the federal courts." As such, my conclusions are twofold: first,
that the legislative history does not unambiguously demonstrate that
the FAA applies only in federal court, as Professor Macneil and Justices O'Connor and Thomas have argued, and, second, that the interpretation offered here leaves fewer ambiguities unexplained-that is,
is more consistent with the legislative history-than the conventional
35 4
wisdom.
IV.

THE LEGITIMACY OF SOUTHLAND AND AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAw

So why does any of this matter? The Supreme Court held in
Southland that the FAA applies in state court, and reaffirmed that
holding in Allied-Bruce. The Court declined once again to revisit the
issue in Circuit City.355 Thus, as Professor Macneil has put it: "The

Chief Justice's official history, however inaccurate, nonetheless remains the law of the land. '3 56 What value is there in reaffirming the

reasoning underlying a settled interpretation of a statute, even in the
face of Professor Macneil's strong critique of that reasoning?
There are at least four reasons why a proper understanding of the
history of the FAA is important for American arbitration law, even
aside from the value of getting the history right.
First, two current members of the U.S. Supreme Court have indicated that they believe Southland should be overruled. Both Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas have voted to overrule Southland, and remain ready to do so if enough other members of the Court are willing
to join them, even if Justice Scalia no longer dissents on that
354

Of course this entire discussion assumes, as Professor Macneil assumes, that

the intent of the supporters of the FAA can be imputed to Congress. See supra note
195.
355

356

See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 2, § 10.2, at 10:5.
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ground.3 5 7 Given their reluctance to consider legislative history when
interpreting statutes, it is unlikely that this Article will persuade those
Justices to vote otherwise.3 58 But at least it offers an alternative view of
that history in the unlikely event the Supreme Court decides to revisit
3 59
Southland once again.
Second, state courts may misapply or misconstrue the FAA, influenced at least in part by their belief that Southland was wrongly decided. Certainly most state courts properly follow the Supreme
Court's holding in Southland. But the view that Southlandinfringed on
state sovereignty contrary to Congress's intent continues to influence
at least some state court judges in their decisions construing the FAA.
One example is Justice Trieweiler's special concurrence in
Casarotto v. Lombardi,360 a Montana Supreme Court opinion that was
vacated by the U.S. Supreme Court.36 1 In voting to uphold the Mon-

tana notice requirement later invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto,Justice Trieweiler wrote,
What I would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially
at the appellate level, to understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive assumption that arbitration
provisions and choice of law provisions are knowingly bargained for,
all of [Montana's] procedural safeguards and substantive laws are
easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to stick a choice of
law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed contract and re3 62
quire the party with inferior bargaining power to sign it.
A more recent example is the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Moore of the Alabama Supreme Court in Selma Medical Center, Inc. v.
Fontenot.363 In dissenting from the majority's holding that contracts
between a hospital and physicians were within the scope of the FAA,
357

See supra text accompanying notes 109-16.

358 However, Justice Thomas's critical view of Southlandis based at least in part on
his interpretation of the FAA's legislative history. See supra text accompanying notes
109-16.
359 Two very recent commentaries renew the call for Southland to be overruled.
See Pittman, supra note 144, at 889-90; Schwartz, supra note 144 (manuscript at
72-73, on file with author). But given that the Supreme Court rejected precisely such
a contention by a 7-2 vote in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272
(1995), the call seems unlikely to be heeded.
360 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994), vacated sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto,
515 U.S. 1129 (1995), reaffd, Casarotto v. Lombardi, 901 P.2d 596 (Mont. 1995), rev'd
sub nom. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
361 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
362 Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 940 (Trieweiler, J., specially concurring).
363 824 So. 2d 668 (Ala. 2001).
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Chief Justice Moore quoted at length from Justice O'Connor's dissent
in Southland and Justice Thomas's dissent in Allied-Bruce,364 and
concluded,
Because Congress wrote and enacted the FAA as a procedural device and intended that it apply exclusively in federal courts, it has
no application to the case before us-a case between Alabama residents and Alabama corporations, based on state-law claims, for
which exclusive jurisdiction lies in a court of the State of
Alabama.

3 65

Only then did the opinion go on to analyze the scope of the FAA,
concluding (not surprisingly) that the contract at issue was not subject
3
to the FAA.

66

Certainly not all (or even most) state court judges are so critical
of the Supreme Court's decision in Southland. Likewise, even were I
to demonstrate beyond any doubt that the FAA was intended to apply
in state court (which I by no means claim to do), hostility to the FAA
in the state judiciary would remain. But perhaps a proper understanding of the FAA's legislative history might reduce that hostility by
some small degree.
Third, Congress may be more likely to amend the FAA to limit
the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements if it views
Southlands application of the FAA to the states as illegitimate. A wide
variety of bills restricting the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses have been introduced into Congress in recent years.

6

7

In the

106th Congress, the House of Representatives unanimously passed the
Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Act of 2000, which
would have made revocable pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts between car dealers and car manufacturers. 368 During the hearings on one such bill, numerous supporters testified that the
legislation was necessary because states could not, under Southland,
364 Id. at 679-80.
365 Id. at 681.
366 Id. at 687-92.
367 See Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 192, 107th Cong.
§ 2 (2001); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 2001, S. 163, 107th Cong. §§ 2-9
(2001); Securing a Future for Independent Agriculture Act of 2001, S. 20, 107th
Cong. § 128(b) (2001); Consumer Fairness Act of 1999, H.R. 2258, 106th Cong. § 2
(1999); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 872, 106th Cong. §§ 2-9
(1999); Civil Rights Procedures Protection Act of 1999, S. 121, 106th Cong. §§ 2-9
(1999); H.R. 613, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
368 Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Act of 2000, H.R. 534, 106th
Cong. § 2 (1999).
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enact their own legislation. 69 One supporter went further and argued that Southland incorrectly construed the FAA as applicable in
state court. 37 0 Such arguments should not be surprising, given that
Justice O'Connor in Allied-Bruce called on Congress to amend the FAA
to overrule Southland.37a Certainly Congress may be more likely to
enact statutes to overrule a Supreme Court decision it sees as wrongly
decided than otherwise. Statutes restricting consumer and employment arbitration should be considered on their own merits, and not
through the lens of correcting the Supreme Court's "mistake" in
Southland.
Fourth, ironically, the criticisms of Southland have the potential to
lead to a broader scope of federal preemption of state arbitration law
than otherwise would be appropriate under the Act. Thus, Professor
Macneil's view of the FAA as an integrated arbitration statute leads
him to argue that the entire Act is applicable in state court and wholly
preempts state arbitration law: "[i] n spite of marginal difficulties, the
better course would be for the Supreme Court to hold that where the
FAA governs a case, state arbitration law is entirely preempted-regardless of whether the case arose in federal or state court. '3 72 Even
though he acknowledges that this position has not been followed by
the Supreme Court, 373 his analysis of the scope of current FAA preemption doctrine also is broader than that of others.3 74 If instead of
an integrated statute fully applicable in state court, the FAA is viewed
more narrowly (i.e., only section 2 is seen as applicable in state court),
the scope of FAA preemption becomes narrower and state regulatory
authority over arbitration remains greater. Such an interpretation of
369 Fairnessand Voluntary Arbitration Act: Hearing on H. 534 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 6-7 (2000)
("[Uinfortunately ... in the 1984 Southland case, arbitrators are not required to
apply the particular ...state law that would be applied by a court."); id. at 16 (arguing
that Southland makes arbitration enforceable in the face of state law); id. at 35 ("In a
landmark case, Southland. . . , the U.S. Supreme Court held that state laws that prohibit mandatory binding arbitration .. .are preempted."); id. at 37 ("[T]he Supreme
Court has clearly interpreted the FAA to preempt state law.").
370 Id. (prepared statement of Richard Holcomb, Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Motor
Vehicles) ("When Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, the narrow intent of Congress

was to make arbitration awards enforceable in federal courts.").
371 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 284 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("It remains now for Congress to correct this interpretation if it wishes to
preserve state autonomy in state courts.").
372 1 MACNEIL, supra note 2, § 10.8.2.2, at 10:84.
373 1 id. § 10.8.2.4, at 10:88.
374 Compare I id. § 10.8.3, with Stephen L. Hayford, FederalPreemption and Vacatur:
The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 67,
71-73, and Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 144, at 208-26.
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also rethe FAA is consistent with its text and legislative history, and
375
system.
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In sum, whether Southland was correctly decided is of more than
merely academic interest. It has important implications for modern
American arbitration law, in the courts and in Congress.
CONCLUSION

This Article challenges the conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v. Keating, holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act applies in state court and preempts state law,
was an illegitimate exercise of judicial lawmaking. Justices O'Connor
and Thomas and commentators, most prominently including Professor Ian Macneil, have strongly criticized Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Southland as disregarding Congress's unambiguous
intent that the FAA apply only in federal court.
I agree that the Chief Justice's opinion failed persuasively to
make the case that the FAA applies in state court. But the Chief Justice nonetheless reached the correct conclusion: "[a]lthough the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications
that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration
agreements enforceable only in the federal courts." 376 A reexamina-

tion of the FAA's legislative history reveals that while the "primary purpose" of the FAA was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in
federal court, a secondary purpose was to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state court.377 A contemporaneous commenta-

tor, overlooked by the critics, sums it up well: "[t]he act is broad
enough to apply to actions commenced in state courts as well as to
those instituted in federal courts, and it was so intended by those who
375 David Schwartz argues for the Supreme Court to correct its "federalism mistake" by overruling Southland and permitting the states to regulate the enforceability
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Schwartz, supra note 144 (manuscript at 73, on
file with author). That action is unlikely, as noted previously. See supra note 359.
More likely is that federalism principles will be important in defining the proper scope
of FAA preemption, as they support a narrower scope of preemption than that favored by Macneil. Further, although not discussed by Schwartz, such federalism values also counsel against enactment of many of the bills pending in Congress that
would make unenforceable pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment and
other contracts. See supra text accompanying notes 366-67. Those bills, no less than
the FAA, override state rules on the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements.
376 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
377 Cohen Brief, supra note 198, at 38.
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drafted it."3 78 While ambiguities in the legislative history remain, this

interpretation of the legislative history results in fewer ambiguities
than the prevailing interpretation.

378

Heuston, supra note 29, at 258.

